echelongraph-mcp
MCP server for CVE lookups: EchelonGraph scores, CISA KEV, EPSS, CWE, exploits, version and SBOM checks, vendor advisories, and per-CVE exposure derived from Shodan data. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan). Keyless.
npm · fingerprint 08d7326810a63c7cfa8eb8c8 · repository · RSS
16tools
6recorded versions
23dtracked
changed 4d ago
What changed
Changed 2026-10-26 12:52 UTC
1 description rewritten, 1 schema or annotation change with the description left byte-identical.
--- pinned/get_cve +++ observed/get_cve { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "One CVE's record: description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cvss_v4_score and cvss_v4_severity, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and score_confidence, epss_score and epss_percentile, CISA-KEV status (kev_listed, kev_added_date, kev_due_date, kev_ransomware) and, if KEV-listed, CISA's own text relayed verbatim (kev_required_action, not EchelonGraph's advice; kev_short_description; kev_notes_urls), ghsa_id, references, cpe_match (one flat list) and cpe_configurations (NVD's configurations as NVD sent them, with each AND/OR operator; absent where none is stored, which is not a finding that no product is affected), remediation (a capped summary of its fix), published, modified and updated_at; each field only where the record has it. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds, or once held, fix evidence for the CVE; patch_evidence is what it holds now, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. freshness is null: this answer carries no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each list in the record keeps its first entries, and the note names each list cut with its full length.", + "description": "One CVE's record: description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cvss_v4_score and cvss_v4_severity, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and score_confidence, epss_score and epss_percentile, CISA-KEV status (kev_listed, kev_added_date, kev_due_date, kev_ransomware) and, if KEV-listed, CISA's own text relayed verbatim (kev_required_action, not EchelonGraph's advice; kev_short_description; kev_notes_urls), ghsa_id, references, cpe_match (one flat list) and cpe_configurations (NVD's configurations as NVD sent them, with each AND/OR operator; absent where none is stored, which is not a finding that no product is affected), remediation (a capped summary of its fix), published, modified and updated_at; each field only where the record has it. Pass a CVE, EUVD or GHSA ID. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds, or once held, fix evidence for the CVE; patch_evidence is what it holds now, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. freshness is null: this answer carries no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each list in the record keeps its first entries, and the note names each list cut with its full length.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "description": "a CVE ID, e.g. CVE-2023-44487", + "description": "a CVE ID, e.g. CVE-2023-44487, or an ENISA EUVD (EUVD-2026-90503), GitHub GHSA, OSV (PYSEC-, GO-, RUSTSEC-, GSD-, MAL-) or GCVE-0 (GCVE-0-2024-3094) ID, which EchelonGraph resolves to its CVE", "type": "string" }, "full": { + "aliases": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "attribution": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "first_seen_at": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "id": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "namespace": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "enisa_euvd", + "github", + "osv" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "source_updated_at": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The CVE's other identifiers that EchelonGraph holds, by namespace then id: GitHub GHSA ids (source github), OSV ids such as PYSEC- and GO- (source osv) and ENISA EUVD ids (source enisa_euvd), each with first_seen_at and, where the source dates it, source_updated_at. An ENISA EUVD id carries attribution, Source: ENISA EUVD; no other id does. EUVD ids are listed only while EchelonGraph displays ENISA's data. A GCVE-0 id is never listed: it is the CVE id itself. Absent where the alias table could not be read, and from an API older than the field." + }, "cna": { "anyOf": [ { - "description": "A probability with a horizon (scorer v4.0): probability is FIRST's EPSS probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days (source first_epss, horizon_days 30, with epss_percentile, epss_score_date and epss_model_version where stored), not EchelonGraph's own model. null, with null_reason no_epss_on_record, where no EPSS is on record: the likelihood is unknown, not low. exploited (true when CISA KEV lists the CVE or EG-KEV rates it Tier 1) and exploited_sources report confirmed exploitation apart from it; it is never folded into probability. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + "description": "A probability with a horizon (scorer v4.0): probability is FIRST's EPSS probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days (source first_epss, horizon_days 30, with epss_percentile, epss_score_date and epss_model_version where stored), not EchelonGraph's own model. null, with null_reason no_epss_on_record, where no EPSS is on record: the likelihood is unknown, not low. exploited (true when CISA KEV lists the CVE, ENISA's EU KEV lists it (scorer v4.1, exploited_sources eu_kev; Source: ENISA EUVD), or EG-KEV rates it Tier 1) and exploited_sources report confirmed exploitation apart from it; it is never folded into probability. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." }, "eg_priority": { "anyOf": [ - "description": "Impact severity alone (scorer v4.0): the CVSS base score from the best-provenance CVSS EchelonGraph holds, which no CISA KEV listing, EPSS probability or EG-KEV tier raises. score (0-10) and severity (the CVSS band), with metric cvss_base, cvss_version, vector, source and provider. assessed false, with score and severity null and unassessed_reason, where no CVSS of any version is published: kev_listed_no_cvss reads exploited, severity not yet published. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + "description": "Impact severity alone (scorer v4.0): the CVSS base score from the best-provenance CVSS EchelonGraph holds, which no CISA KEV listing, ENISA EU KEV listing (scorer v4.1), EPSS probability or EG-KEV tier raises. score (0-10) and severity (the CVSS band), with metric cvss_base, cvss_version, vector, source and provider. assessed false, with score and severity null and unassessed_reason, where no CVSS of any version is published: kev_listed_no_cvss reads exploited, severity not yet published, and eu_kev_listed_no_cvss (v4.1) the same for a CVE only ENISA's EU KEV lists (Source: ENISA EUVD). Absent from a record scored before v4.0." }, "epss_percentile": { "type": [ + "eu_kev": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "attribution": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "date_added": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "euvd_id": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "first_seen_at": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "listed": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "product": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "reported_by": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "enisa_euvd", + "github", + "osv" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "vendor_project": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The CVE's listing on ENISA's EU Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue: date_added (ENISA's own date for it), reported_by (the reporting source as ENISA records it), euvd_id, vendor_project, product and first_seen_at, with source enisa_euvd and attribution, ENISA's acknowledgement beginning Source: ENISA EUVD, on every listing. It is ENISA's data, not EchelonGraph's or CISA's; kev_listed is CISA's catalog. Absent where ENISA's catalogue does not list the CVE, while EchelonGraph does not display ENISA's data, and from an API older than the field." + }, "ghsa_id": { "type": [ "string", + "resolved_from": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "attribution": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "id": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "namespace": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "enisa_euvd", + "github", + "osv", + "gcve_gna0" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Present when the identifier asked for was not the CVE id: id and namespace are what was asked for (an EUVD, GHSA, OSV or GCVE-0 id), and source what mapped it to this CVE: enisa_euvd, github or osv through EchelonGraph's alias table, or gcve_gna0, the GCVE specification, under which GCVE-0-YYYY-N is CVE-YYYY-N. With source enisa_euvd it carries attribution, Source: ENISA EUVD." + }, "score_assessed": { "description": "Whether EchelonGraph has scored the CVE. true: echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are its score. false: the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0, and any of those three it carries is a placeholder, not a rating; the API may leave them out. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not say whether the CVE was scored.", "type": [ - "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed. eg_severity, eg_likelihood and eg_priority (scorer v4.0): the same objects as the record's top-level fields. eg_risk.severity_source (v4.0): what EG Risk's severity term read, eg_severity, vendor_severity, or unknown_kev_most_urgent (no severity published for a CISA KEV CVE, so the most urgent value)." + "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed. eg_severity, eg_likelihood and eg_priority (scorer v4.0): the same objects as the record's top-level fields. eg_risk.severity_source (v4.0): what EG Risk's severity term read, eg_severity, vendor_severity, or unknown_kev_most_urgent (no severity published for a CISA KEV CVE, so the most urgent value; v4.1: unknown_eu_kev_most_urgent, the same for a CVE only ENISA's EU KEV lists). eu_kev (scorer v4.1): present when ENISA's EU KEV catalogue lists the CVE, { listed, source, attribution }, which says that ENISA lists it and carries ENISA's acknowledgement (Source: ENISA EUVD); rule_triggered eu_kev_exploitation is the rule that floors such a CVE at 9.0 when CISA's KEV catalog does not list it." }, "score_unassessed_reason": { "description": "Why score_assessed is false: no_signal, no source has yet published severity data EchelonGraph can score; or rejected, the record was withdrawn by its numbering authority and is never scored. Absent when the CVE is scored.",
--- pinned/search_cves +++ observed/search_cves { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, + "aliases": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "attribution": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "first_seen_at": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "id": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "namespace": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "enisa_euvd", + "github", + "osv" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "source_updated_at": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The CVE's other identifiers that EchelonGraph holds, by namespace then id: GitHub GHSA ids (source github), OSV ids such as PYSEC- and GO- (source osv) and ENISA EUVD ids (source enisa_euvd), each with first_seen_at and, where the source dates it, source_updated_at. An ENISA EUVD id carries attribution, Source: ENISA EUVD; no other id does. EUVD ids are listed only while EchelonGraph displays ENISA's data. A GCVE-0 id is never listed: it is the CVE id itself. Absent where the alias table could not be read, and from an API older than the field." + }, "cna": { "anyOf": [ { - "description": "A probability with a horizon (scorer v4.0): probability is FIRST's EPSS probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days (source first_epss, horizon_days 30, with epss_percentile, epss_score_date and epss_model_version where stored), not EchelonGraph's own model. null, with null_reason no_epss_on_record, where no EPSS is on record: the likelihood is unknown, not low. exploited (true when CISA KEV lists the CVE or EG-KEV rates it Tier 1) and exploited_sources report confirmed exploitation apart from it; it is never folded into probability. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + "description": "A probability with a horizon (scorer v4.0): probability is FIRST's EPSS probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days (source first_epss, horizon_days 30, with epss_percentile, epss_score_date and epss_model_version where stored), not EchelonGraph's own model. null, with null_reason no_epss_on_record, where no EPSS is on record: the likelihood is unknown, not low. exploited (true when CISA KEV lists the CVE, ENISA's EU KEV lists it (scorer v4.1, exploited_sources eu_kev; Source: ENISA EUVD), or EG-KEV rates it Tier 1) and exploited_sources report confirmed exploitation apart from it; it is never folded into probability. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." }, "eg_priority": { "anyOf": [ - "description": "Impact severity alone (scorer v4.0): the CVSS base score from the best-provenance CVSS EchelonGraph holds, which no CISA KEV listing, EPSS probability or EG-KEV tier raises. score (0-10) and severity (the CVSS band), with metric cvss_base, cvss_version, vector, source and provider. assessed false, with score and severity null and unassessed_reason, where no CVSS of any version is published: kev_listed_no_cvss reads exploited, severity not yet published. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + "description": "Impact severity alone (scorer v4.0): the CVSS base score from the best-provenance CVSS EchelonGraph holds, which no CISA KEV listing, ENISA EU KEV listing (scorer v4.1), EPSS probability or EG-KEV tier raises. score (0-10) and severity (the CVSS band), with metric cvss_base, cvss_version, vector, source and provider. assessed false, with score and severity null and unassessed_reason, where no CVSS of any version is published: kev_listed_no_cvss reads exploited, severity not yet published, and eu_kev_listed_no_cvss (v4.1) the same for a CVE only ENISA's EU KEV lists (Source: ENISA EUVD). Absent from a record scored before v4.0." }, "epss_percentile": { "type": [ + "eu_kev": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "attribution": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "date_added": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "euvd_id": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "first_seen_at": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "listed": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "product": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "reported_by": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "enisa_euvd", + "github", + "osv" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "vendor_project": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The CVE's listing on ENISA's EU Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue: date_added (ENISA's own date for it), reported_by (the reporting source as ENISA records it), euvd_id, vendor_project, product and first_seen_at, with source enisa_euvd and attribution, ENISA's acknowledgement beginning Source: ENISA EUVD, on every listing. It is ENISA's data, not EchelonGraph's or CISA's; kev_listed is CISA's catalog. Absent where ENISA's catalogue does not list the CVE, while EchelonGraph does not display ENISA's data, and from an API older than the field." + }, "ghsa_id": { "type": [ "string", + "resolved_from": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "attribution": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "id": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "namespace": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "enisa_euvd", + "github", + "osv", + "gcve_gna0" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Present when the identifier asked for was not the CVE id: id and namespace are what was asked for (an EUVD, GHSA, OSV or GCVE-0 id), and source what mapped it to this CVE: enisa_euvd, github or osv through EchelonGraph's alias table, or gcve_gna0, the GCVE specification, under which GCVE-0-YYYY-N is CVE-YYYY-N. With source enisa_euvd it carries attribution, Source: ENISA EUVD." + }, "score_assessed": { "description": "Whether EchelonGraph has scored the CVE. true: echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are its score. false: the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0, and any of those three it carries is a placeholder, not a rating; the API may leave them out. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not say whether the CVE was scored.", "type": [ - "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed. eg_severity, eg_likelihood and eg_priority (scorer v4.0): the same objects as the record's top-level fields. eg_risk.severity_source (v4.0): what EG Risk's severity term read, eg_severity, vendor_severity, or unknown_kev_most_urgent (no severity published for a CISA KEV CVE, so the most urgent value)." + "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed. eg_severity, eg_likelihood and eg_priority (scorer v4.0): the same objects as the record's top-level fields. eg_risk.severity_source (v4.0): what EG Risk's severity term read, eg_severity, vendor_severity, or unknown_kev_most_urgent (no severity published for a CISA KEV CVE, so the most urgent value; v4.1: unknown_eu_kev_most_urgent, the same for a CVE only ENISA's EU KEV lists). eu_kev (scorer v4.1): present when ENISA's EU KEV catalogue lists the CVE, { listed, source, attribution }, which says that ENISA lists it and carries ENISA's acknowledgement (Source: ENISA EUVD); rule_triggered eu_kev_exploitation is the rule that floors such a CVE at 9.0 when CISA's KEV catalog does not list it." }, "score_unassessed_reason": { "description": "Why score_assessed is false: no_signal, no source has yet published severity data EchelonGraph can score; or rejected, the record was withdrawn by its numbering authority and is never scored. Absent when the CVE is scored.", + "resolved_from": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "attribution": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "id": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "namespace": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "enisa_euvd", + "github", + "osv", + "gcve_gna0" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Present when the search term was an EUVD, GHSA, OSV or GCVE-0 id: what it was, and what mapped it (enisa_euvd, github or osv through EchelonGraph's alias table; gcve_gna0, the GCVE specification), with attribution, Source: ENISA EUVD, when enisa_euvd mapped it. The rows are then exactly the CVEs it names." + }, "search_relaxed": { "description": "true: a search phrase was relaxed to all of its words.", "type": [
Changed 2026-10-25 11:18 UTC
7 descriptions rewritten, 9 schema or annotation changes with the description left byte-identical.
--- pinned/check_affected +++ observed/check_affected { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "assessed": { "description": "The answer's assessed, first: null when the answer does not say.", - "description": "Which lookup path this call asked for.", - "enum": [ - "cpe", - "registry" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "cpe", + "registry" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } ], - "type": "string" + "description": "Which lookup path this call asked for." }, "match_layer": { "type": [ + "cpe_version_end_excluding": { + "description": "CPE match: NVD's versionEndExcluding for the range that matched, the first version that range no longer holds. Not a fix, and never fixed_in: another range of the same CVE, or a vendor backport, can sit past it. Absent on a registry match, and where the range sets no such end.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "cpe_version_end_including": { + "description": "CPE match: NVD's versionEndIncluding for the range that matched, the last version that range holds. Not a fix, and never fixed_in. Absent on a registry match, and where the range sets no such end.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "cve_id": { "type": [ "string", - "description": "Advisories decided as not affecting this version.", + "description": "CVEs decided as not affecting this version: on the registry path one per CVE, however many of its advisory records are stored (advisories_considered counts those).", "type": [ "number", "null" - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/check_sbom +++ observed/check_sbom { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Check a dependency list against EchelonGraph's advisory corpus, one verdict per component. For container images and Kubernetes pods, the input is an SBOM of each image, or its purls. Pass purls (package URLs, up to 2,000 distinct) or sbom (a CycloneDX or SPDX JSON document, up to 5,000,000 characters). This server reads the purls from the document; only they are sent to the API, in POST bodies of at most 200, never in a URL; the document itself is not sent on. Run from npm, this server is on your machine; over the hosted endpoint (mcp.echelongraph.io) it is EchelonGraph's, and the document is the request body, accepted up to 6 MiB. data.results holds one row per component sent, in order, with verdict (affected, not_affected, undetermined or not_assessed), not_assessed_reason, cve_ids, matched_package and matched_via (a deb or apk purl's upstream qualifier matches as its source package); each match carries fixed_in (the next unaffected version) or null with fixed_in_reason. data.summary counts the verdicts. not_affected is the only clean verdict: not_assessed (no verdict, as for a deb, apk or rpm purl without a distro qualifier naming its release, which EchelonGraph does not guess) and undetermined are not, and the note counts both. The API allows 1,200 components a minute per caller; on a 429 the tool waits out Retry-After, up to 50 seconds a call, then answers what it has, the rest in data.not_sent_purls, unchecked and not clean. Input with more than 2,000 distinct purls is refused, not truncated. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps index, purl, verdict, not_assessed_reason and cve_ids at least, each match its fixed_in while kept; not_affected rows leave the text first, then not_assessed ones; not_sent_purls keeps its first 10.", + "description": "Check a dependency list against EchelonGraph's advisory corpus, one verdict per component. For container images and Kubernetes pods, the input is an SBOM of each image, or its purls. Pass purls (package URLs, up to 2,000 distinct, 10,000 with repeats) or sbom (a CycloneDX or SPDX JSON document, up to 5,000,000 characters). This server reads the document's purls; only they are sent to the API, in POST bodies of at most 200, never in a URL; the document itself is not sent on. Run from npm, this server is on your machine; over the hosted endpoint (mcp.echelongraph.io) it is EchelonGraph's, and the document is the request body, accepted up to 6 MiB. data.results holds one row per component sent, in order, with verdict (affected, not_affected, undetermined or not_assessed), not_assessed_reason, cve_ids, matched_package and matched_via (a deb or apk purl's upstream qualifier matches as its source package); each match carries fixed_in (the next unaffected version) or null with fixed_in_reason. data.summary counts the verdicts. not_affected is the only clean verdict: not_assessed (no verdict, as for a deb, apk or rpm purl without a distro qualifier naming its release, which EchelonGraph does not guess) and undetermined are not, and the note counts both. The API allows 1,200 components a minute per caller; on a 429 the tool waits out Retry-After, up to 50 seconds a call, then answers what it has, the rest in data.not_sent_purls, not clean. Input with more than 2,000 distinct purls is refused, not truncated. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps index, purl, verdict, not_assessed_reason and cve_ids at least, each match its fixed_in while kept; not_affected rows leave the text first, then not_assessed ones; not_sent_purls keeps its first 10.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "description": "package URLs to check, e.g. pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.20 or pkg:deb/debian/openssl@3.0.11-1~deb12u1?distro=debian-12 (up to 2,000 distinct, sent in batches of 200)", + "description": "package URLs to check, e.g. pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.20 or pkg:deb/debian/openssl@3.0.11-1~deb12u1?distro=debian-12 (up to 2,000 distinct, sent in batches of 200), in a list of at most 10,000 entries, repeats included", "items": { "type": "string" }, + "maxItems": 10000, "type": "array" }, "sbom": { + "maxProperties": 64, "propertyNames": { "type": "string" }, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "batch_size": { "description": "The most purls one request carries (the API's cap per request).", - "description": "What was passed: a purl list, a CycloneDX JSON document or an SPDX JSON document.", - "enum": [ - "purls", - "cyclonedx", - "spdx" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "purls", + "cyclonedx", + "spdx" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } ], - "type": "string" + "description": "What was passed: a purl list, a CycloneDX JSON document or an SPDX JSON document." }, "not_assessed": { "anyOf": [ - "enum": [ - "time_budget", - "rate_limited", - "request_failed" - ], - "type": "string" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "time_budget", + "rate_limited", + "request_failed" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] }, { "type": "null" - "additionalProperties": false, - "description": "Present only on a row whose matches the structured result's cut (DATA CUT) shortened or left out: total, the row's matches in the answer; returned, the ones data keeps (its first, highest effective_score first); and, while they fit, of all its matches, the CVE IDs KEV-listed (kev_listed_cve_ids) or used in ransomware (ransomware_cve_ids), and the distinct fixed_in versions (fixed_in_versions). The same call with full: true returns every match.", + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "Present only on a row whose matches the structured result's cut (DATA CUT) shortened or left out: total, the row's matches in the answer; returned, the ones data keeps (chosen used in ransomware first, then the other KEV-listed ones, then highest effective_score, and listed in the API's order); and, while they fit, of all its matches, the CVE IDs KEV-listed (kev_listed_cve_ids) or used in ransomware (ransomware_cve_ids), and the distinct fixed_in versions (fixed_in_versions). The same call with full: true returns every match.", "properties": { "fixed_in_versions": { "items": { - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/cve_exposure +++ observed/cve_exposure { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "in_scope": { "description": "The API's tracked verdict: whether the CVE is in the radar's tracked set; null when the answer does not say.", + "description": "The CISA-KEV catalog flag: true when EchelonGraph's CVE record marks the CVE as CISA-KEV-listed. false also where EchelonGraph holds no record of the CVE, so a false says what EchelonGraph's data holds, not that the CVE is outside CISA's catalog.", "type": [ "boolean", "null" + "description": "Deprecated: the same value as kev_seen_in_observations, kept for compatibility. It is the radar's observation flag, not CISA-KEV catalog status: false for a CISA-KEV CVE the radar holds no service for (CVE-2024-3400 on 2026-10-10: kev_listed false, kev_catalog_listed true). kev_catalog_listed is the catalog flag.", "type": [ "boolean", "null" + "description": "true: at least one of the radar's service rows for the CVE carries the CISA-KEV flag copied in when the radar matched that service; false where none does, as for a CVE the radar holds no service for. It is the radar's observation flag, not CISA-KEV catalog status.", "type": [ "boolean", "null" - "enum": [ - "exposed", - "measured_zero", - "not_assessed", - "tracking_unknown" - ], - "type": "string" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "exposed", + "measured_zero", + "not_assessed", + "tracking_unknown" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] }, { "type": "null" - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/cve_intel +++ observed/cve_intel { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Weakness, exploit code, detection templates, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, source_published_at (the source's date, null if none), eg_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph recorded it) and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total, exploits_capped, exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version, fixed_branches), fixed_versions (each fixed version with the vulnerable_range it fixes) and timeline (newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). fixed_branches lists each affected range on record (from introduced (\"0\" is the first version) to below fixed, or through last_affected, with advisory_id (its OSV record) and source); in the ecosystem's version order, an affected version's fix is the first fixed above it that no range of its row holds (none past a range with no fixed). fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility, not the fix for every affected range. fixed_branches [] is not a finding that no fix exists. verified_status is the source's label, not a guarantee the exploit works on a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Its structured result carries notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; its coverage names the sections relayed, failed and left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", + "description": "Weakness, exploit code, detection checks, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, source_published_at (the source's date, null if none), eg_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph recorded it) and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total, exploits_capped, exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version, fixed_branches), fixed_versions (each fixed version with the vulnerable_range it fixes) and timeline (newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). fixed_branches lists each affected range on record (from introduced (\"0\" is the first version) to below fixed, or through last_affected, with advisory_id (its OSV record) and source); in the ecosystem's version order, an affected version's fix is the first fixed above it that no range of its row holds (none past a range with no fixed). fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility, not the fix for every affected range. fixed_branches [] is not a finding that no fix exists. verified_status is the source's label, not a guarantee the exploit works on a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Its structured result carries notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; its coverage names the sections relayed, failed and left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "affected_packages": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "api_row_limit": { "description": "The most rows the API returns for this list per CVE: a list this long may be cut.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "api_row_limit": { "description": "The most rows the API returns for this list per CVE: a list this long may be cut.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "api_row_limit": { "description": "The most rows the API returns for this list per CVE: a list this long may be cut.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "api_row_limit": { "maximum": 9007199254740991, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "affected_packages": { "items": { - "description": "metasploit, exploit_db, nuclei_template, github_poc or vendor_poc.", + "description": "Exploit code: metasploit, exploit_db, github_poc or vendor_poc. A detection check, which checks whether a system is affected and is not necessarily exploit code: nuclei_template (a Nuclei detection template) or github_checker (a GitHub repository named or described as a checker or scanner). A kind not named here is one this server does not classify: the note counts it as neither.", "type": [ "string", "null" - "description": "verified_status is the label stored with each reference: verified for a Metasploit module, for an Exploit-DB entry Exploit-DB marks verified, and for curated seed rows marked so; reported for a public artefact nothing has confirmed works (nuclei templates, GitHub proofs of concept, unverified Exploit-DB entries); unconfirmed where a curated row says so. It is a label from the source, not a guarantee that the exploit works against a given system.", + "description": "verified_status is the label stored with each reference: verified for a Metasploit module, for an Exploit-DB entry Exploit-DB marks verified, and for curated seed rows marked so; reported for a public artefact nothing has confirmed works (nuclei templates, GitHub proofs of concept and checker repositories, unverified Exploit-DB entries); unconfirmed where a curated row says so. It is a label from the source, not a guarantee that the exploit works against a given system.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "description": "Every reference on record counted by kind (the values of each exploit's kind), past the 10 listed; the counts under nuclei_template and github_checker are detection checks, not exploit code, those under metasploit, exploit_db, github_poc and vendor_poc are exploit code, and those under any other kind are of a kind this server does not classify, counted as neither.", "propertyNames": { "type": "string" }, - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/cve_remediation +++ observed/cve_remediation { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "installed_asked": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "ecosystem": { "type": "string" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "description": "Present only where the structured result's cut (DATA CUT) kept this package's first ranges, not all: total, its ranges in the answer; returned, the ones data keeps. The same call with full: true returns every range.", "properties": { "returned": { - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/cve_summary +++ observed/cve_summary { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Summary of EchelonGraph's CVE Pulse feed: summary.total active CVEs, their counts by severity band (summary.critical, summary.high, summary.medium, summary.low), the count with no band (summary.none), and summary.last_updated, the newest modification time among those records. summary.none is not a severity rating of None: it counts the active CVEs with no severity band from any source, that is, CVEs not yet scored, and the answer may carry the same count again as summary.unscored. Whenever summary.none is above zero the note says so, and names those CVEs not yet scored, not CVEs rated None. summary.nvd_critical, summary.nvd_high, summary.nvd_medium, summary.nvd_low and summary.nvd_none count the same active CVEs as summary.total by NVD's CVSS severity label: provenance, never EchelonGraph's severity band. summary.nvd_none is neither a count of CVEs rated None nor the count of CVEs with no severity, which is summary.none. summary.rejected counts the CVE records rejected (withdrawn) by their numbering authority, which summary.total and the other counts above leave out: they are withdrawn records, none of them a vulnerability. poller holds the in-memory counters of the NVD poller of the one API instance that answered, counted since that instance last started and zeroed on every restart: they describe that instance, never the feed's size, intake, reliability or freshness. Whenever the answer carries poller the note says so. The feed is polled from its sources on a schedule; this is the state as of that update. Its structured result's state is measured, with freshness null (the feed serves no poll-completion time) and data equal to the API's JSON less each poller field (or the whole poller) the note names as left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", + "description": "Summary of EchelonGraph's CVE Pulse feed: summary.total active CVEs, their counts by severity band (summary.critical, summary.high, summary.medium, summary.low), the count with no band (summary.none), and summary.last_updated, the newest modification time among those records. summary.none is not a severity rating of None: it counts the active CVEs with no severity band from any source, that is, CVEs not yet scored, and the answer may carry the same count again as summary.unscored. Whenever summary.none is above zero the note says so, and names those CVEs not yet scored, not CVEs rated None. summary.nvd_critical, summary.nvd_high, summary.nvd_medium, summary.nvd_low and summary.nvd_none count the same active CVEs as summary.total by NVD's CVSS severity label: provenance, never EchelonGraph's severity band. summary.nvd_none is neither a count of CVEs rated None nor the count of CVEs with no severity, which is summary.none. summary.rejected counts the CVE records rejected (withdrawn) by their numbering authority, which summary.total and the other counts above leave out: they are withdrawn records, none of them a vulnerability. poller holds the in-memory counters of the NVD poller of the one API instance that answered, counted since that instance last started and zeroed on every restart: they describe that instance, never the feed's size, intake, reliability or freshness. Whenever the answer carries poller the note says so. Its structured result's state is measured, with freshness.nvd_poll the fleet's last completed NVD poll and its interval, from the answer's nvd_poll (freshness null without one), and data equal to the API's JSON less each poller field (or the whole poller) the note names as left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "description": "What the answer covers; null where the answer says nothing about it.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "What the answer covers; null where the answer says nothing about it." }, "data": { "additionalProperties": {}, + "nvd_poll": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "interval": { + "description": "The poll's configured interval, a Go duration such as 20m0s." + }, + "last_completed_at": { + "description": "When the fleet last completed an NVD poll, in RFC 3339: the end of the last window fetched and stored without an error." + }, + "scope": { + "description": "Whose poll it is: fleet, every API instance's, never the answering instance's alone." + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + {} + ], + "description": "When the fleet of API instances last completed an NVD poll: last_completed_at (RFC 3339; the end of the last window fetched and stored without an error), scope fleet, and interval, the poll's interval. The answer leaves it out where that time is unknown. freshness.nvd_poll relays it where scope is fleet and last_completed_at is a real RFC 3339 time at most 5 minutes after this server's clock." + }, "poller": { "anyOf": [ { - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "nvd_poll": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "The fleet's last completed NVD poll, from data.nvd_poll. freshness is null where the answer carries no nvd_poll, or one without such a time.", + "properties": { + "interval": { + "description": "data.nvd_poll.interval as the API sent it, a Go duration such as 20m0s: the interval the NVD poll runs at; null where the answer gives none in that form.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "last_run_at": { + "description": "data.nvd_poll.last_completed_at as the API sent it: the end of the window the fleet's last completed NVD poll stored, whichever API instance ran it; never the answering instance's poller.last_poll_at.", + "type": "string" + }, + "scope": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "const": "fleet", + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ], + "description": "Whose poll it is: the fleet's, as data.nvd_poll.scope says." + } + }, + "required": [ + "last_run_at", + "scope", + "interval" + ], + "type": "object" + } + }, + "required": [ + "nvd_poll" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/epss_history +++ observed/epss_history { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "complete_since": { "anyOf": [ + "days_in_progress": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Score dates a refresh that has not finished is applying (#3143): held for some CVEs so far. A date an earlier refresh failed part-way on is in days_partial too. Null when the API did not say." + }, "days_missing": { "description": "Score dates from first_day to last_day the record does not hold.", "items": { - "description": "Score dates held for some CVEs only.", + "description": "Score dates held for some CVEs only, because their refreshes failed part-way.", "items": { "type": "string" }, + "refresh_runs_truncated": { + "description": "True when only the newest refreshes of the run log were read, so the earliest score dates are not listed; null when the API did not say.", + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "runs_undated": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Logged refreshes with no score date (#3143): the days they applied are not counted, so a day in days_missing may be held for the CVEs they changed, and their points carry no score_date. Null when the API did not say." + }, "series_complete": { "description": "True only when the API says nothing in the record predates complete_since.", "type": "boolean" - "enum": [ - "change_only" - ], - "type": "string" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "change_only" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] }, "series_starts_at": { "anyOf": [ - "days_missing" + "days_missing", + "days_in_progress", + "runs_undated", + "refresh_runs_truncated" ], "type": "object" }, + "days_in_progress": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "description": "A FIRST score date, YYYY-MM-DD.", + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Score dates no refresh completed and one that has not finished is applying: some CVEs hold that day so far. Not counted held or missing; also in days_partial when an earlier refresh of it failed part-way." + }, "days_missing": { "anyOf": [ { - "description": "Score dates whose refreshes all failed part-way: some CVEs hold that day, some do not." + "description": "Score dates no refresh completed and one failed part-way: some CVEs hold that day, some do not. Also in days_in_progress while a retry of it has not finished." }, "first_day": { "anyOf": [ + "description": "True when only the newest refreshes of the run log were read, so the earliest score dates are not listed.", "type": [ "boolean", "null" - ] + ], + "description": "Logged refreshes with no score date: the days they applied are not counted held, partial or in progress, and their points carry no score_date." }, "series_complete": { "description": "True only when nothing in the record predates complete_since.", - "description": "Always change_only: one point per recorded change, none for a day without one.", - "enum": [ - "change_only" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "change_only" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } ], - "type": "string" + "description": "Always change_only: one point per recorded change, none for a day without one." }, "series_starts_at": { "anyOf": [ - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "days_in_progress": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Score dates a refresh that has not finished is applying (#3143): held for some CVEs so far. A date an earlier refresh failed part-way on is in days_partial too. Null when the API did not say." + }, "days_missing": { "description": "Score dates from first_day to last_day the record does not hold.", "items": { - "description": "Score dates held for some CVEs only.", + "description": "Score dates held for some CVEs only, because their refreshes failed part-way.", "items": { "type": "string" }, + "refresh_runs_truncated": { + "description": "True when only the newest refreshes of the run log were read, so the earliest score dates are not listed; null when the API did not say.", + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "runs_undated": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Logged refreshes with no score date (#3143): the days they applied are not counted, so a day in days_missing may be held for the CVEs they changed, and their points carry no score_date. Null when the API did not say." + }, "series_complete": { "description": "True only when the API says nothing in the record predates complete_since.", "type": "boolean" - "days_missing" + "days_missing", + "days_in_progress", + "runs_undated", + "refresh_runs_truncated" ], "type": "object" },
--- pinned/exposure_radar +++ observed/exposure_radar { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "answered": { "description": "The radars that answered. On a failure their answers are withheld.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "description": "A field this version cannot label is left out of data and named in the note. Each of the kev_exposure, exposed_databases and leaked_credentials radars also carries generated_at, when the API computed its totals, and, when the API can tell, last_run_at. kev_exposure.last_run_at, exposed_databases.last_run_at and leaked_credentials.last_run_at are timestamps, not counts: each is when that radar last completed a check, a cycle whose reads succeeded, among them a Shodan search (for exposed_databases, or its LeakIX fallback) that answered at least one query, or for leaked_credentials a read of the public GitHub event stream. A cycle that read nothing does not move it, and it is not the time of every record a radar's numbers count, which cover everything still on record, not only what the last check found. A radar whose answer carries no last_run_at has none in the result, and the note says nothing about it. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan).", "properties": { "exposed_databases": { - "additionalProperties": false, - "description": "exposed_databases: exposed_databases.distinct_hosts counts distinct ip:port services the check confirmed answering without authentication, and exposed_databases.engines the distinct engine types among them; exposed_databases.top_engines and exposed_databases.top_countries rank up to 15 engines and 10 countries by those services. exposed_databases.pii_likely and exposed_databases.pci_likely count services whose schema names (never record values) pass a high-confidence, precision-first gate for personal or payment-card data, so a service outside them is not shown to hold no such data. exposed_databases.window.from and exposed_databases.window.to are timestamps, not counts: when EchelonGraph's check last confirmed the oldest and the newest of the services counted, a span of checks made at different times; with a counted service that has no such time on record there is no window.", + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "exposed_databases: exposed_databases.distinct_hosts counts distinct ip:port services the check confirmed answering without authentication, and exposed_databases.engines the distinct engine types among them; exposed_databases.top_engines and exposed_databases.top_countries rank up to 15 engines and 10 countries by those services. exposed_databases.pii_likely and exposed_databases.pci_likely count services whose schema names (never record values) pass a high-confidence, precision-first gate for personal or payment-card data, so a service outside them is not shown to hold no such data. exposed_databases.window.from and exposed_databases.window.to are timestamps, not counts: when EchelonGraph's check last confirmed the oldest and the newest of the services counted, a span of checks made at different times; with a counted service that has no such time on record there is no window, and exposed_databases.dated_window.from and exposed_databases.dated_window.to span the dated services only, while exposed_databases.dated_window.undated counts those with none.", "properties": { + "dated_window": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "Timestamps over the dated rows only, relayed when some counted rows carry no observation time: a span of observations made at different times, never one observation time and never a count.", + "properties": { + "from": { + "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", + "type": "string" + }, + "to": { + "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", + "type": "string" + }, + "undated": { + "description": "How many of the rows the counts count have no observation time on record. from and to do not describe them.", + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 1, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "from", + "to", + "undated" + ], + "type": "object" + }, "distinct_hosts": { "type": "number" }, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "country": { "type": "string" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "engine": { "type": "string" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "from": { "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", - "additionalProperties": false, - "description": "kev_exposure: kev_exposure.distinct_hosts counts distinct ip:port services, not machines (a machine answering on two ports counts twice), with at least one CISA-KEV-listed CVE on record, and kev_exposure.ransomware_hosts those with a ransomware-linked one; kev_exposure.kev_cves_exposed and kev_exposure.ransomware_cves count distinct CVEs with at least one such service; kev_exposure.correlations counts service×CVE pairs, not services, so a service with three KEV CVEs counts three times. kev_exposure.top_products, kev_exposure.top_countries and kev_exposure.top_cves rank up to 12 products, 10 countries and 12 CVEs by those services; kev_exposure.top_cves[].cvss_v3_score and kev_exposure.top_cves[].epss_score are the highest CVSS v3 base score and EPSS probability recorded on that CVE's observations. kev_exposure.trend counts service×CVE pairs still on record by the week in which each was first recorded, over 12 weeks, so earlier weeks read low. kev_exposure.newest_kev lists the 15 CVEs that EchelonGraph's CVE records most recently mark as CISA-KEV-listed, each with an exposure_state: exposed, where kev_exposure.newest_kev[].exposed_hosts counts distinct ip:port services on record with it; or not_assessed, where the API's answer holds no measurement for that CVE (its 0 is not one) and no count is relayed, and this answer does not say whether the radar tracks that CVE: tracking is answered per CVE. kev_exposure.newest_kev[].cvss_v3_score and kev_exposure.newest_kev[].epss_score are the CVE record's CVSS v3 base score and EPSS probability. kev_exposure.window.from and kev_exposure.window.to are timestamps, not counts: when Shodan collected the banners of the oldest and the newest of the service×CVE pairs counted, a span of observations made at different times; with a counted pair that has no such time on record there is no window. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan).", + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "kev_exposure: kev_exposure.distinct_hosts counts distinct ip:port services, not machines (a machine answering on two ports counts twice), with at least one CISA-KEV-listed CVE on record, and kev_exposure.ransomware_hosts those with a ransomware-linked one; kev_exposure.kev_cves_exposed and kev_exposure.ransomware_cves count distinct CVEs with at least one such service; kev_exposure.correlations counts service×CVE pairs, not services, so a service with three KEV CVEs counts three times. kev_exposure.top_products, kev_exposure.top_countries and kev_exposure.top_cves rank up to 12 products, 10 countries and 12 CVEs by those services; kev_exposure.top_cves[].cvss_v3_score and kev_exposure.top_cves[].epss_score are the highest CVSS v3 base score and EPSS probability recorded on that CVE's observations. kev_exposure.trend counts service×CVE pairs still on record by the week in which each was first recorded, over 12 weeks, so earlier weeks read low. kev_exposure.newest_kev lists the 15 CVEs that EchelonGraph's CVE records most recently mark as CISA-KEV-listed, each with an exposure_state: exposed, where kev_exposure.newest_kev[].exposed_hosts counts distinct ip:port services on record with it; or not_assessed, where the API's answer holds no measurement for that CVE (its 0 is not one) and no count is relayed, and this answer does not say whether the radar tracks that CVE: tracking is answered per CVE. kev_exposure.newest_kev[].cvss_v3_score and kev_exposure.newest_kev[].epss_score are the CVE record's CVSS v3 base score and EPSS probability. kev_exposure.window.from and kev_exposure.window.to are timestamps, not counts: when Shodan collected the banners of the oldest and the newest of the service×CVE pairs counted, a span of observations made at different times; with a counted pair that has no such time on record there is no window, and kev_exposure.dated_window.from and kev_exposure.dated_window.to span the dated pairs only, while kev_exposure.dated_window.undated counts the pairs with none. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan).", "properties": { "correlations": { "type": "number" + "dated_window": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "Timestamps over the dated rows only, relayed when some counted rows carry no observation time: a span of observations made at different times, never one observation time and never a count.", + "properties": { + "from": { + "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", + "type": "string" + }, + "to": { + "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", + "type": "string" + }, + "undated": { + "description": "How many of the rows the counts count have no observation time on record. from and to do not describe them.", + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 1, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "from", + "to", + "undated" + ], + "type": "object" + }, "distinct_hosts": { "type": "number" }, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "added_date": { "type": "string" - "enum": [ - "exposed", - "measured_zero", - "not_assessed" - ], - "type": "string" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "exposed", + "measured_zero", + "not_assessed" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] }, "ransomware": { "type": "boolean" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "country": { "type": "string" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "cve_id": { "type": "string" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "hosts": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "new_exposures": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "from": { "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", - "additionalProperties": false, - "description": "leaked_credentials: leaked_credentials.total counts (repository, secret) pairs, not distinct secrets, so one secret in three repositories counts three times; leaked_credentials.distinct_secrets counts each secret once and leaked_credentials.distinct_repos counts repositories; leaked_credentials.top_providers and leaked_credentials.top_types rank up to 15 providers and secret types by those pairs. None is validated: each is a credential-shaped string that passed EchelonGraph's filters, at most structurally checked and never tested against its provider. leaked_credentials.window.from and leaked_credentials.window.to are timestamps, not counts: when EchelonGraph's detector last found the oldest and the newest of the pairs counted.", + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "leaked_credentials: leaked_credentials.total counts (repository, secret) pairs, not distinct secrets, so one secret in three repositories counts three times; leaked_credentials.distinct_secrets counts each secret once and leaked_credentials.distinct_repos counts repositories; leaked_credentials.top_providers and leaked_credentials.top_types rank up to 15 providers and secret types by those pairs. None is validated: each is a credential-shaped string that passed EchelonGraph's filters, at most structurally checked and never tested against its provider. leaked_credentials.window.from and leaked_credentials.window.to are timestamps, not counts: when EchelonGraph's detector last found the oldest and the newest of the pairs counted; with a counted pair that has no such time on record there is no window, and leaked_credentials.dated_window.from and leaked_credentials.dated_window.to span the dated pairs only, while leaked_credentials.dated_window.undated counts those with none.", "properties": { + "dated_window": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "Timestamps over the dated rows only, relayed when some counted rows carry no observation time: a span of observations made at different times, never one observation time and never a count.", + "properties": { + "from": { + "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", + "type": "string" + }, + "to": { + "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", + "type": "string" + }, + "undated": { + "description": "How many of the rows the counts count have no observation time on record. from and to do not describe them.", + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 1, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "from", + "to", + "undated" + ], + "type": "object" + }, "distinct_repos": { "type": "number" }, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "count": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "count": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "from": { "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "description": "mcp_servers: counts and timestamps only, no hostname. mcp_servers.total counts hostnames the AI-exposure radar has checked for an MCP server, each once by its latest verdict on record, and not every one is an MCP server; EchelonGraph's own control servers are left out, and mcp_servers.own_controls_excluded counts them; hostnames whose owner opted out of scanning are not checked again while the opt-out stands, so their last verdict is left out too, and mcp_servers.withheld_opted_out counts them. mcp_servers.total is mcp_servers.protected plus mcp_servers.pending_readjudication plus mcp_servers.not_assessed. mcp_servers.protected counts hostnames whose /mcp endpoint asked for credentials and whose OAuth protected-resource metadata validated under RFC 9728; mcp_servers.prm_via divides them by where that document was found: mcp_servers.prm_via.header, mcp_servers.prm_via.wellknown_path and mcp_servers.prm_via.wellknown_root. mcp_servers.pending_readjudication counts verdicts of a rule since replaced, not yet re-checked. mcp_servers.not_assessed counts the rest, whose protection the radar could not assess (not assessed does not mean unprotected), and mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason puts each in one bucket. mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.identified_no_challenge holds servers that identified themselves as MCP servers and did not ask for credentials at the handshake. That is normal in MCP: authorization is optional in the spec, and a server can enforce it at tools/call instead, which EchelonGraph never sends, so this bucket is not a finding of exposure. mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.resource_mismatch, mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.cross_origin_pointer, mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.bare_challenge_no_prm, mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.pointer_unreachable, mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.pointer_invalid, mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.no_authorization_servers, mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.wellknown_unreachable and mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.metadata_invalid hold endpoints that asked for credentials but whose RFC 9728 metadata did not validate, by why, so none of them is shown to lack protection; mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.challenge_unadjudicated holds endpoints that asked for credentials before that check existed, not yet re-checked. mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.no_http_answer holds hostnames that gave no HTTP answer, and mcp_servers.not_assessed_by_reason.not_identified_as_mcp hostnames whose HTTP answer identified no MCP server. mcp_servers.era divides every counted hostname by protocol era: mcp_servers.era.legacy; mcp_servers.era.dual, a lower bound; mcp_servers.era.modern, not proven modern-only; mcp_servers.era.unknown; and mcp_servers.era.not_measured, recorded before the era probe and not re-checked since. mcp_servers.transport divides them by transport: mcp_servers.transport.streamable_http, mcp_servers.transport.legacy_sse, mcp_servers.transport.unknown and mcp_servers.transport.not_measured. mcp_servers.window.from and mcp_servers.window.to are when the oldest and the newest of the verdicts counted were last checked. mcp_servers.last_run_at is a timestamp, not a count: when the AI-exposure radar, which checks other AI services too, last completed a check; mcp_servers.enabled is whether one completed within 45 minutes of the answer, and mcp_servers.counted_at is when the API read the counts. A partition whose buckets do not add up to the count it divides is left out and named; an answer that does not say it is the MCP-server counts, or whose mcp_servers.total, mcp_servers.protected, mcp_servers.pending_readjudication and mcp_servers.not_assessed are missing or contradict each other, is a failure.", "properties": { "counted_at": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "dual": { "maximum": 9007199254740991, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "bare_challenge_no_prm": { "maximum": 9007199254740991, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "header": { "maximum": 9007199254740991, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "legacy_sse": { "maximum": 9007199254740991, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "from": { "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", - "additionalProperties": false, - "description": "shadow_ai: the result is regrouped by what each number counts. shadow_ai.confirmed_exposed counts services EchelonGraph's probes found answering without an authentication gate (liveness active, or rechecking during a re-check): confirmed_exposed.total is the sum of confirmed_exposed.by_category, and confirmed_exposed.last_24h counts those first recorded in the last 24 h. Of the shadow_ai numbers, only confirmed_exposed counts exposed services. confirmed_exposed.window.from and confirmed_exposed.window.to are timestamps, not counts: when EchelonGraph's verifier ran the probe that last decided the oldest and the newest of those services, a span of probes made at different times. shadow_ai.observed counts every Certificate Transparency or Shodan observation on record, whatever its verification state: its numbers are observed, not exposed. They are observed.total; observed.by_category (the same observations by category); observed.last_24h (those first recorded in the last 24 h); observed.trend_30d (observations per UTC day over the last 30 days); and observed.top_products, observed.top_countries and observed.top_issuers (up to ten products, countries and issuers ranked by observations, where an issuer is the certificate's CA for a Certificate Transparency observation and the hosting operator Shodan reports for a Shodan one). shadow_ai.authentication counts observations by probe outcome: authentication.observed where a probe observed an authentication gate (a 401/403, a login page or an auth marker), and authentication.not_determined where the service answered but no probe could tell. Neither authentication count is part of confirmed_exposed, and observed.total minus confirmed_exposed.total is not a count of secured services. The shadow-AI poller block carries only running and last_run_at: last_run_at is when the radar's leader last completed a Certificate Transparency (crt.sh) cycle, and its running is true only when that was within 30 minutes of the answer. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan).", + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "shadow_ai: the result is regrouped by what each number counts. shadow_ai.confirmed_exposed counts services EchelonGraph's probes found answering without an authentication gate (liveness active, or rechecking during a re-check): confirmed_exposed.total is the sum of confirmed_exposed.by_category, and confirmed_exposed.last_24h counts those first recorded in the last 24 h. Of the shadow_ai numbers, only confirmed_exposed counts exposed services. confirmed_exposed.window.from and confirmed_exposed.window.to are timestamps, not counts: when EchelonGraph's verifier ran the probe that last decided the oldest and the newest of those services, a span of probes made at different times; with one that has no such time there is no window, and confirmed_exposed.dated_window.from and confirmed_exposed.dated_window.to span the dated ones only, while confirmed_exposed.dated_window.undated counts those with none. shadow_ai.observed counts every Certificate Transparency or Shodan observation on record, whatever its verification state: its numbers are observed, not exposed. They are observed.total; observed.by_category (the same observations by category); observed.last_24h (those first recorded in the last 24 h); observed.trend_30d (observations per UTC day over the last 30 days); and observed.top_products, observed.top_countries and observed.top_issuers (up to ten products, countries and issuers ranked by observations, where an issuer is the certificate's CA for a Certificate Transparency observation and the hosting operator Shodan reports for a Shodan one). shadow_ai.authentication counts observations by probe outcome: authentication.observed where a probe observed an authentication gate (a 401/403, a login page or an auth marker), and authentication.not_determined where the service answered but no probe could tell. Neither authentication count is part of confirmed_exposed, and observed.total minus confirmed_exposed.total is not a count of secured services. The shadow-AI poller block carries only running and last_run_at: last_run_at is when the radar's leader last completed a Certificate Transparency (crt.sh) cycle, and its running is true only when that was within 30 minutes of the answer. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan).", "properties": { "authentication": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "not_determined": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "by_category": { "additionalProperties": { + "dated_window": { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "Timestamps over the dated rows only, relayed when some counted rows carry no observation time: a span of observations made at different times, never one observation time and never a count.", + "properties": { + "from": { + "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", + "type": "string" + }, + "to": { + "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", + "type": "string" + }, + "undated": { + "description": "How many of the rows the counts count have no observation time on record. from and to do not describe them.", + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 1, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "from", + "to", + "undated" + ], + "type": "object" + }, "last_24h": { "type": "number" }, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "from": { "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "by_category": { "additionalProperties": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "count": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "count": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "count": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "count": { "type": "number" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "last_run_at": { "description": "An RFC 3339 instant.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "exposed_databases": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "last_run_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "last_run_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "last_run_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "enabled": { "type": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "last_run_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/get_cve +++ observed/get_cve { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "One CVE's record: description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cvss_v4_score and cvss_v4_severity, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and score_confidence, epss_score and epss_percentile, CISA-KEV status (kev_listed, kev_added_date, kev_due_date, kev_ransomware) and, if KEV-listed, CISA's own text relayed verbatim (kev_required_action, not EchelonGraph's advice; kev_short_description; kev_notes_urls), ghsa_id, references, cpe_match (one flat list) and cpe_configurations (NVD's configurations as NVD sent them, with each AND/OR operator; absent where none is stored, which is not a finding that no product is affected), remediation (a capped summary of its fix), published, modified and updated_at; each field only where the record has it. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds, or once held, fix evidence for the CVE; patch_evidence is what it holds now, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each list in the record keeps its first entries, and the note names each list cut with its full length.", + "description": "One CVE's record: description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cvss_v4_score and cvss_v4_severity, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and score_confidence, epss_score and epss_percentile, CISA-KEV status (kev_listed, kev_added_date, kev_due_date, kev_ransomware) and, if KEV-listed, CISA's own text relayed verbatim (kev_required_action, not EchelonGraph's advice; kev_short_description; kev_notes_urls), ghsa_id, references, cpe_match (one flat list) and cpe_configurations (NVD's configurations as NVD sent them, with each AND/OR operator; absent where none is stored, which is not a finding that no product is affected), remediation (a capped summary of its fix), published, modified and updated_at; each field only where the record has it. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds, or once held, fix evidence for the CVE; patch_evidence is what it holds now, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. freshness is null: this answer carries no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each list in the record keeps its first entries, and the note names each list cut with its full length.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "description": "What the answer covers; null where the answer says nothing about it.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "What the answer covers; null where the answer says nothing about it." }, "data": { "additionalProperties": {}, - "description": "EchelonGraph's 0-100 risk priority, fused from the score, exploitation and automatability: a rating only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false it is a placeholder.", + "description": "EchelonGraph's 0-100 risk priority, fused from impact severity (eg_severity, from scorer v4.0; the score before it), exploitation and automatability, with EchelonGraph's hand-set weights: a rating only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false it is a placeholder.", "type": [ "number", "null" - "description": "EchelonGraph's 0-10 score for the CVE: a score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false it is a placeholder, not a rating.", + "description": "EchelonGraph's 0-10 score for the CVE: severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation (a CISA KEV listing floors it at 9.0) and lifted toward 9.0 by EPSS; eg_severity is the impact severity alone. A score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false it is a placeholder, not a rating.", "type": [ "number", "null" + "eg_likelihood": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "exploited": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "exploited_sources": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "horizon_days": { + "type": [ + "number", + "null" + ] + }, + "null_reason": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "probability": { + "type": [ + "number", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "A probability with a horizon (scorer v4.0): probability is FIRST's EPSS probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days (source first_epss, horizon_days 30, with epss_percentile, epss_score_date and epss_model_version where stored), not EchelonGraph's own model. null, with null_reason no_epss_on_record, where no EPSS is on record: the likelihood is unknown, not low. exploited (true when CISA KEV lists the CVE or EG-KEV rates it Tier 1) and exploited_sources report confirmed exploitation apart from it; it is never folded into probability. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + }, + "eg_priority": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "bod_26_04": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "if_not_publicly_exposed": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "if_publicly_exposed": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "inputs": {}, + "ssvc": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "decision": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "mission": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The decision (scorer v4.0): ssvc, the decision CISA's SSVC table gives as EchelonGraph applies it (decision at medium mission impact, as echelongraph_ssvc_decision, and by_mission), null with null_reason not_assessed for a CVE EchelonGraph has not assessed; bod_26_04, CISA BOD 26-04's timeline if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed (CERT/CC's keys 3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU); inputs, kev, exploitation, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + }, + "eg_severity": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "assessed": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "provider": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "score": { + "type": [ + "number", + "null" + ] + }, + "severity": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "unassessed_reason": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Impact severity alone (scorer v4.0): the CVSS base score from the best-provenance CVSS EchelonGraph holds, which no CISA KEV listing, EPSS probability or EG-KEV tier raises. score (0-10) and severity (the CVSS band), with metric cvss_base, cvss_version, vector, source and provider. assessed false, with score and severity null and unassessed_reason, where no CVSS of any version is published: kev_listed_no_cvss reads exploited, severity not yet published. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + }, "epss_percentile": { "type": [ "number", - "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed." + "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed. eg_severity, eg_likelihood and eg_priority (scorer v4.0): the same objects as the record's top-level fields. eg_risk.severity_source (v4.0): what EG Risk's severity term read, eg_severity, vendor_severity, or unknown_kev_most_urgent (no severity published for a CISA KEV CVE, so the most urgent value)." }, "score_unassessed_reason": { "description": "Why score_assessed is false: no_signal, no source has yet published severity data EchelonGraph can score; or rejected, the record was withdrawn by its numbering authority and is never scored. Absent when the CVE is scored.", - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/get_cwe +++ observed/get_cwe { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "max_page": { "type": [ - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/get_vendor_advisory +++ observed/get_vendor_advisory { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "One vendor advisory in full, by vendor and the vendor's advisory ID (the vendor and vendor_advisory_id of a vendor advisory row): title, description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cve_ids and known_cve_ids (those with a record in EchelonGraph's CVE feed), affected_products, remediation, references, vendor_modified_at, and withdrawn_at and withdrawn_reason when the vendor withdrew it. remediations lists each remediation the vendor lists, with kind (the vendor's own category, never read from the text: vendor_fix, workaround, mitigation, no_fix_planned, none_available or other), source_category, text, url and the cve_ids and product_ids it covers; each text is the vendor's, verbatim, untested by EchelonGraph. remediation_state is parsed, none_in_source, not_parsed or withdrawn: none_in_source and not_parsed are not a finding that no fix exists. Each advisory carries vendor_published_at (the vendor's date), our_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph first recorded it) and withdrawn (true: the vendor rescinded it). Each advisory also carries rejected_cve_ids: the CVE IDs it names whose CVE record was rejected (withdrawn) by its numbering authority, which are not active vulnerabilities. coverage.vendor_window is that vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories, earliest_vendor_published_at, latest_vendor_published_at, held_since (where that window begins) and history_backfill (in_progress or not_started: older advisories not all held yet); null when the windows could not be read or carry none for that vendor. measured_at is our_first_seen_at. Its freshness is null: the answer carries no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", + "description": "One vendor advisory in full, by vendor and the vendor's advisory ID (the vendor and vendor_advisory_id of a vendor advisory row, never its advisory_id, EchelonGraph's internal UUID): title, description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cve_ids and known_cve_ids (those with a record in EchelonGraph's CVE feed), affected_products, remediation, references, vendor_modified_at, and withdrawn_at and withdrawn_reason when the vendor withdrew it. remediations lists each remediation the vendor lists, with kind (the vendor's own category, never read from the text: vendor_fix, workaround, mitigation, no_fix_planned, none_available or other), source_category, text, url and the cve_ids and product_ids it covers; each text is the vendor's, verbatim, untested by EchelonGraph. remediation_state is parsed, none_in_source, not_parsed or withdrawn: none_in_source and not_parsed are not a finding that no fix exists. Each advisory carries vendor_published_at (the vendor's date), our_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph first recorded it) and withdrawn (true: the vendor rescinded it). Each advisory also carries rejected_cve_ids: the CVE IDs it names whose CVE record was rejected (withdrawn) by its numbering authority, which are not active vulnerabilities. coverage.vendor_window is that vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories, earliest_vendor_published_at, latest_vendor_published_at, held_since (where that window begins) and history_backfill (in_progress or not_started: older advisories not all held yet); null when the windows could not be read or carry none for that vendor. measured_at is our_first_seen_at. Its freshness is null: the answer carries no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "description": "the vendor's advisory ID, e.g. RHSA-2024:1234 or GHSA-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx", + "description": "the vendor's own advisory ID, a row's vendor_advisory_id, e.g. RHSA-2024:1234, GHSA-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx or CVE-2024-3400; not a row's advisory_id, EchelonGraph's internal UUID", "type": "string" }, "full": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "vendor_window": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "description": "A vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories (how many EchelonGraph holds from that vendor), earliest_vendor_published_at and latest_vendor_published_at (the earliest and latest vendor_published_at among them, null when none is held), held_since (the start of the window EchelonGraph has read that vendor's advisories from, before which an advisory may not be held; null when none is held or the API does not say; for a vendor with no history read it is when its feed was first read from, and can be years after earliest_vendor_published_at, since an older advisory is held when the vendor revised it later, not the ones published beside it) and history_backfill: complete (the vendor's published history has been read back as far as its source goes), in_progress or not_started (it is still being read, so the vendor's older advisories are not all held yet), or not_supported (EchelonGraph has no history read for that vendor, so what it holds is what the vendor's feed has carried).", "properties": { "advisories": { + "description": "EchelonGraph's internal ID for this advisory, a UUID. It is not the vendor's advisory ID (vendor_advisory_id), and an advisory's detail is not looked up by it: the detail is keyed on vendor and vendor_advisory_id.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "description": "The vendor's own ID for the advisory (e.g. RHSA-2024:1234, GHSA-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx, or the CVE ID for Microsoft and Palo Alto Networks). With vendor, it is the key an advisory's detail is looked up by, as its advisory_id argument.", "type": [ "string", "null" - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/kev_recent +++ observed/kev_recent { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "catalog": { - "const": "CISA KEV catalog", - "type": "string" + "anyOf": [ + { + "const": "CISA KEV catalog", + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] }, "catalog_count": { "description": "CISA's own count, in the catalog last fetched.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "catalog_version": { "type": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/scan_manifest +++ observed/scan_manifest { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Check a project's lockfile or pinned manifest against EchelonGraph's advisory corpus, one verdict per dependency. Pass files: 1 to 20 of filename and content, up to 5,000,000 characters in all; the filename, or format, gives the format. Read: requirements.txt (== and === pins only), go.mod (require, after replace and exclude), package-lock.json and npm-shrinkwrap.json (v1 to v3), Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock, composer.lock, poetry.lock and gradle.lockfile. package.json, pyproject.toml, Pipfile, Gemfile, Cargo.toml, composer.json and build.gradle hold ranges and are refused, naming the lockfile to pass; go.sum is refused: it lists versions the build does not select. This server reads the files into purls and only the purls are sent to the API, in POST bodies of at most 200, never in a URL; filenames and file contents are not sent on. Run from npm, this server is on your machine; over the hosted endpoint (mcp.echelongraph.io) it is EchelonGraph's, and the files are the request body, accepted up to 6 MiB. data.results holds one row per distinct purl, with verdict (affected, not_affected, undetermined or not_assessed), not_assessed_reason, cve_ids and matched_via; each match carries kev_listed, epss_score and fixed_in or null with fixed_in_reason. not_affected is the only clean verdict. data.not_checked lists each entry not sent, with file, line and reason: version_unpinned (a range), version_unresolved, local_path, vcs_source or unsupported_line; not_checked entries are not clean. At most 2,000 distinct purls per call, within 50 seconds; data.not_sent_purls lists any not sent, unchecked and not clean. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps index, purl, verdict, not_assessed_reason and cve_ids at least; not_checked keeps its first 20.", + "description": "Check a project's lockfile or pinned manifest against EchelonGraph's advisory corpus, one verdict per dependency. Pass files: 1 to 20 of filename and content, up to 5,000,000 characters in all; the filename or format gives the format. Read: requirements.txt (== and === pins only), go.mod (require, after replace and exclude), package-lock.json and npm-shrinkwrap.json (v1-v3), Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock, composer.lock, poetry.lock and gradle.lockfile. package.json, pyproject.toml, Pipfile, Gemfile, Cargo.toml, composer.json and build.gradle hold ranges and are refused, naming the lockfile; go.sum is refused: it lists versions the build does not select. The server reads the files into purls; only the purls are sent to the API, in POST bodies of at most 200, never in a URL; filenames and file contents are not sent on. Run from npm, this server is on your machine; over the hosted endpoint (mcp.echelongraph.io) it is EchelonGraph's, and the files are the request body, up to 6 MiB. data.results holds a row per distinct purl, with verdict (affected, not_affected, undetermined or not_assessed), not_assessed_reason, cve_ids and matched_via; each match carries kev_listed, epss_score and fixed_in or null with fixed_in_reason. not_affected is the only clean verdict. data.not_checked lists each entry not sent (file, line, reason); not_checked entries are not clean. At most 2,000 distinct purls and 50 seconds a call. The API allows 1,200 components a minute per caller; on a 429 it waits out Retry-After within that; a later batch cut off, refused or failed ends the call, the rest in data.not_sent_purls, unchecked, not clean. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps index, purl, verdict, not_assessed_reason and cve_ids at least; not_checked its first 20.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "maxItems": 20, "type": "array" }, "full": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "batch_size": { "description": "The most purls one request carries (the API's cap per request).", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "description": "not_checked, counted by reason.", "properties": { "local_path": { - "enum": [ - "time_budget", - "rate_limited", - "request_failed" - ], - "type": "string" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "time_budget", + "rate_limited", + "request_failed" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] }, { "type": "null" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "description": "Each file passed, in order, and how it was read. Filenames and contents are not sent to the API.", "properties": { "files": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "ecosystem": { "description": "The OSV ecosystem of the purls read from it.", - "enum": [ - "requirements.txt", - "go.mod", - "package-lock.json", - "Cargo.lock", - "Gemfile.lock", - "composer.lock", - "poetry.lock", - "gradle.lockfile" - ], - "type": "string" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "requirements.txt", + "go.mod", + "package-lock.json", + "Cargo.lock", + "Gemfile.lock", + "composer.lock", + "poetry.lock", + "gradle.lockfile" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] }, { "type": "null" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "from": { "type": "string" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "detail": { "type": "string" - "description": "version_unpinned: a range or wildcard, not one version; version_unresolved: no single registry version (none given, a branch, or an excluded go.mod version); local_path: a directory, file or workspace member; vcs_source: a VCS checkout; unsupported_line: a line or entry this tool does not read (another file named by -r or -c, a direct URL, another registry).", - "enum": [ - "version_unpinned", - "version_unresolved", - "local_path", - "vcs_source", - "unsupported_line" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "version_unpinned", + "version_unresolved", + "local_path", + "vcs_source", + "unsupported_line" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } ], - "type": "string" + "description": "version_unpinned: a range or wildcard, not one version; version_unresolved: no single registry version (none given, a branch, or an excluded go.mod version); local_path: a directory, file or workspace member; vcs_source: a VCS checkout; unsupported_line: a line or entry this tool does not read (another file named by -r or -c, a direct URL, another registry)." }, "spec": { "description": "What the file says for the entry: its line, or its lockfile key and version (at most 200 characters).", - "additionalProperties": false, - "description": "Present only on a row whose matches the structured result's cut (DATA CUT) shortened or left out: total, the row's matches in the answer; returned, the ones data keeps (its first, highest effective_score first); and, while they fit, of all its matches, the CVE IDs KEV-listed (kev_listed_cve_ids) or used in ransomware (ransomware_cve_ids), and the distinct fixed_in versions (fixed_in_versions). The same call with full: true returns every match.", + "additionalProperties": {}, + "description": "Present only on a row whose matches the structured result's cut (DATA CUT) shortened or left out: total, the row's matches in the answer; returned, the ones data keeps (chosen used in ransomware first, then the other KEV-listed ones, then highest effective_score, and listed in the API's order); and, while they fit, of all its matches, the CVE IDs KEV-listed (kev_listed_cve_ids) or used in ransomware (ransomware_cve_ids), and the distinct fixed_in versions (fixed_in_versions). The same call with full: true returns every match.", "properties": { "fixed_in_versions": { "items": { - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/search_cves +++ observed/search_cves { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Search/list CVEs from EchelonGraph's CVE feed (NVD + MITRE-CNA pre-NVD + CISA-KEV + EPSS + GitHub GHSA, each polled on a schedule). Filter by severity, minimum CVSS, free text, and sort; page with limit and offset. Returns cves, each with cve_id, severity, cvss_v3_score, echelongraph_score and score_assessed (whether EchelonGraph has scored it), epss_score and kev_listed where the record has them, and the list's total, total_counted (false: total is not a count), total_is_lower_bound (true: at least total), search_relaxed, limit and offset. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds, or once held, fix evidence for the CVE; patch_evidence is what it holds now, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps at least the fields named above and the first 200 characters of its description (100 on a page too long for that), or rows are left out and the note gives the offset to call next.", + "description": "Search/list CVEs from EchelonGraph's CVE feed (NVD + MITRE-CNA pre-NVD + CISA-KEV + EPSS + GitHub GHSA, each polled on a schedule). Filter by severity, minimum CVSS, free text, and sort; page with limit and offset. Returns cves, each with cve_id, severity, cvss_v3_score, echelongraph_score and score_assessed (whether EchelonGraph has scored it), epss_score and kev_listed where the record has them, and the list's total, total_counted (false: total is not a count), total_is_lower_bound (true: at least total), search_relaxed, limit and offset. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds, or once held, fix evidence for the CVE; patch_evidence is what it holds now, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. freshness is null: this answer carries no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps at least the fields named above and the first 200 characters of its description (100 on a page too long for that), or rows are left out and the note gives the offset to call next.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "limit": { "type": [ - "description": "EchelonGraph's 0-100 risk priority, fused from the score, exploitation and automatability: a rating only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false it is a placeholder.", + "description": "EchelonGraph's 0-100 risk priority, fused from impact severity (eg_severity, from scorer v4.0; the score before it), exploitation and automatability, with EchelonGraph's hand-set weights: a rating only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false it is a placeholder.", "type": [ "number", "null" - "description": "EchelonGraph's 0-10 score for the CVE: a score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false it is a placeholder, not a rating.", + "description": "EchelonGraph's 0-10 score for the CVE: severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation (a CISA KEV listing floors it at 9.0) and lifted toward 9.0 by EPSS; eg_severity is the impact severity alone. A score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false it is a placeholder, not a rating.", "type": [ "number", "null" + "eg_likelihood": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "exploited": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "exploited_sources": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "horizon_days": { + "type": [ + "number", + "null" + ] + }, + "null_reason": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "probability": { + "type": [ + "number", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "A probability with a horizon (scorer v4.0): probability is FIRST's EPSS probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days (source first_epss, horizon_days 30, with epss_percentile, epss_score_date and epss_model_version where stored), not EchelonGraph's own model. null, with null_reason no_epss_on_record, where no EPSS is on record: the likelihood is unknown, not low. exploited (true when CISA KEV lists the CVE or EG-KEV rates it Tier 1) and exploited_sources report confirmed exploitation apart from it; it is never folded into probability. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + }, + "eg_priority": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "bod_26_04": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "if_not_publicly_exposed": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "if_publicly_exposed": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "inputs": {}, + "ssvc": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "decision": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "mission": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The decision (scorer v4.0): ssvc, the decision CISA's SSVC table gives as EchelonGraph applies it (decision at medium mission impact, as echelongraph_ssvc_decision, and by_mission), null with null_reason not_assessed for a CVE EchelonGraph has not assessed; bod_26_04, CISA BOD 26-04's timeline if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed (CERT/CC's keys 3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU); inputs, kev, exploitation, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + }, + "eg_severity": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "assessed": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "provider": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "score": { + "type": [ + "number", + "null" + ] + }, + "severity": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "source": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "unassessed_reason": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Impact severity alone (scorer v4.0): the CVSS base score from the best-provenance CVSS EchelonGraph holds, which no CISA KEV listing, EPSS probability or EG-KEV tier raises. score (0-10) and severity (the CVSS band), with metric cvss_base, cvss_version, vector, source and provider. assessed false, with score and severity null and unassessed_reason, where no CVSS of any version is published: kev_listed_no_cvss reads exploited, severity not yet published. Absent from a record scored before v4.0." + }, "epss_percentile": { "type": [ "number", - "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed." + "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed. eg_severity, eg_likelihood and eg_priority (scorer v4.0): the same objects as the record's top-level fields. eg_risk.severity_source (v4.0): what EG Risk's severity term read, eg_severity, vendor_severity, or unknown_kev_most_urgent (no severity published for a CISA KEV CVE, so the most urgent value)." }, "score_unassessed_reason": { "description": "Why score_assessed is false: no_signal, no source has yet published severity data EchelonGraph can score; or rejected, the record was withdrawn by its numbering authority and is never scored. Absent when the CVE is scored.", - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/search_vendor_advisories +++ observed/search_vendor_advisories { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "limit": { "type": [ - "enum": [ - "word", - "substring" - ], - "type": "string" + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "word", + "substring" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] }, { "type": "null" - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "description": "A vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories (how many EchelonGraph holds from that vendor), earliest_vendor_published_at and latest_vendor_published_at (the earliest and latest vendor_published_at among them, null when none is held), held_since (the start of the window EchelonGraph has read that vendor's advisories from, before which an advisory may not be held; null when none is held or the API does not say; for a vendor with no history read it is when its feed was first read from, and can be years after earliest_vendor_published_at, since an older advisory is held when the vendor revised it later, not the ones published beside it) and history_backfill: complete (the vendor's published history has been read back as far as its source goes), in_progress or not_started (it is still being read, so the vendor's older advisories are not all held yet), or not_supported (EchelonGraph has no history read for that vendor, so what it holds is what the vendor's feed has carried).", "properties": { "advisories": { + "description": "EchelonGraph's internal ID for this advisory, a UUID. It is not the vendor's advisory ID (vendor_advisory_id), and an advisory's detail is not looked up by it: the detail is keyed on vendor and vendor_advisory_id.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "description": "The vendor's own ID for the advisory (e.g. RHSA-2024:1234, GHSA-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx, or the CVE ID for Microsoft and Palo Alto Networks). With vendor, it is the key an advisory's detail is looked up by, as its advisory_id argument.", "type": [ "string", "null" - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
--- pinned/vendor_advisories_for_cve +++ observed/vendor_advisories_for_cve { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "at_cap": { "description": "true: the answer is full, so the vendor feeds may hold more advisories for this CVE than it lists.", - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "description": "A vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories (how many EchelonGraph holds from that vendor), earliest_vendor_published_at and latest_vendor_published_at (the earliest and latest vendor_published_at among them, null when none is held), held_since (the start of the window EchelonGraph has read that vendor's advisories from, before which an advisory may not be held; null when none is held or the API does not say; for a vendor with no history read it is when its feed was first read from, and can be years after earliest_vendor_published_at, since an older advisory is held when the vendor revised it later, not the ones published beside it) and history_backfill: complete (the vendor's published history has been read back as far as its source goes), in_progress or not_started (it is still being read, so the vendor's older advisories are not all held yet), or not_supported (EchelonGraph has no history read for that vendor, so what it holds is what the vendor's feed has carried).", "properties": { "advisories": { + "description": "EchelonGraph's internal ID for this advisory, a UUID. It is not the vendor's advisory ID (vendor_advisory_id), and an advisory's detail is not looked up by it: the detail is keyed on vendor and vendor_advisory_id.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "description": "The vendor's own ID for the advisory (e.g. RHSA-2024:1234, GHSA-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx, or the CVE ID for Microsoft and Palo Alto Networks). With vendor, it is the key an advisory's detail is looked up by, as its advisory_id argument.", "type": [ "string", "null" - "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", - "type": "null" + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one." }, "measured_at": { "anyOf": [ - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "returned": { "maximum": 9007199254740991,
Changed 2026-10-18 10:56 UTC
3 descriptions rewritten, 13 schema or annotation changes with the description left byte-identical.
--- pinned/check_affected +++ observed/check_affected { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/check_sbom +++ observed/check_sbom { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [ + "matches_truncated": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "description": "Present only on a row whose matches the structured result's cut (DATA CUT) shortened or left out: total, the row's matches in the answer; returned, the ones data keeps (its first, highest effective_score first); and, while they fit, of all its matches, the CVE IDs KEV-listed (kev_listed_cve_ids) or used in ransomware (ransomware_cve_ids), and the distinct fixed_in versions (fixed_in_versions). The same call with full: true returns every match.", + "properties": { + "fixed_in_versions": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "kev_listed_cve_ids": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "ransomware_cve_ids": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, "not_affected_count": { "type": [ "number",
--- pinned/cve_exposure +++ observed/cve_exposure { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/cve_intel +++ observed/cve_intel { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Weakness, public exploit code, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, source_published_at (the source's date, null if none), eg_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph recorded it) and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total, exploits_capped, exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version, fixed_branches), fixed_versions (each fixed version with the vulnerable_range it fixes) and timeline (the newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). fixed_branches lists each affected range on record (from introduced (\"0\" is the first version) to below fixed, or through last_affected, with advisory_id (its OSV record) and source); in the ecosystem's version order, an affected version's fix is the first fixed above it that no range of its row holds (none past a range with no fixed). fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility, not the fix for every affected range. fixed_branches [] is not a finding that no fix exists. verified_status is the source's label, not a guarantee the exploit works on a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Its structured result carries notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; its coverage names the sections relayed, failed and left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", + "description": "Weakness, exploit code, detection templates, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, source_published_at (the source's date, null if none), eg_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph recorded it) and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total, exploits_capped, exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version, fixed_branches), fixed_versions (each fixed version with the vulnerable_range it fixes) and timeline (newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). fixed_branches lists each affected range on record (from introduced (\"0\" is the first version) to below fixed, or through last_affected, with advisory_id (its OSV record) and source); in the ecosystem's version order, an affected version's fix is the first fixed above it that no range of its row holds (none past a range with no fixed). fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility, not the fix for every affected range. fixed_branches [] is not a finding that no fix exists. verified_status is the source's label, not a guarantee the exploit works on a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Its structured result carries notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; its coverage names the sections relayed, failed and left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/cve_remediation +++ observed/cve_remediation { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [ + "section": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "statement": { "type": [ "string", + }, + "vendor_released": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "statement": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] } }, "type": "object" - "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read." + "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read. vendor_released (basis vendor_fix_released) is the vendor's own statement that a fix is released where the CVE record names no fixed version: its sentence, verbatim (statement, or null), never a version, so the fixed release is the vendor advisory's to name. solution_by's section is workarounds when the fix sentence is the record's workaround, not its solution." }, "fixed_branches": { "anyOf": [ + "fixed_branches_truncated": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "description": "Present only where the structured result's cut (DATA CUT) kept this package's first ranges, not all: total, its ranges in the answer; returned, the ones data keeps. The same call with full: true returns every range.", + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": -9007199254740991, + "type": "integer" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": -9007199254740991, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, "fixed_version": { "description": "One range's fix, kept for compatibility; not the fix for every affected range.", "type": [
--- pinned/cve_summary +++ observed/cve_summary { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "description": "What the answer covers; null where the answer says nothing about it.",
--- pinned/epss_history +++ observed/epss_history { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/exposure_radar +++ observed/exposure_radar { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/get_cve +++ observed/get_cve { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "One CVE's record: description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cvss_v4_score and cvss_v4_severity, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and score_confidence, epss_score and epss_percentile, CISA-KEV status (kev_listed, kev_added_date, kev_due_date, kev_ransomware) and, if KEV-listed, CISA's own text relayed verbatim (kev_required_action, not EchelonGraph's advice; kev_short_description; kev_notes_urls), ghsa_id, references, cpe_match (one flat list) and cpe_configurations (NVD's configurations as NVD sent them, with each AND/OR operator; absent where none is stored, which is not a finding that no product is affected), remediation (a capped summary of its fix), published, modified and updated_at; each field only where the record has it. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds evidence of a fix for the CVE, and patch_evidence names its sources, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each list in the record keeps its first entries, and the note names each list cut with its full length.", + "description": "One CVE's record: description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cvss_v4_score and cvss_v4_severity, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and score_confidence, epss_score and epss_percentile, CISA-KEV status (kev_listed, kev_added_date, kev_due_date, kev_ransomware) and, if KEV-listed, CISA's own text relayed verbatim (kev_required_action, not EchelonGraph's advice; kev_short_description; kev_notes_urls), ghsa_id, references, cpe_match (one flat list) and cpe_configurations (NVD's configurations as NVD sent them, with each AND/OR operator; absent where none is stored, which is not a finding that no product is affected), remediation (a capped summary of its fix), published, modified and updated_at; each field only where the record has it. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds, or once held, fix evidence for the CVE; patch_evidence is what it holds now, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each list in the record keeps its first entries, and the note names each list cut with its full length.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "description": "What the answer covers; null where the answer says nothing about it.", - "description": "The sentence of the CVE record's solutions, written by its CNA, that names a released fix, verbatim: what makes cna_solution patch evidence. It is the CNA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. Absent where the record's solutions name no fixed version, as well as where the field itself is: Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field.", + "description": "The sentence of the CVE record's solutions or workarounds, written by its CNA, that names a released fix, verbatim: what makes cna_solution patch evidence. It is the CNA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. cna_solution_section says which of the two sections it is. Absent where the record's solutions name no fixed version, as well as where the field itself is: Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "cna_solution_section": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "solution", + "workaround" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Which section of the CVE record cna_solution was read from: solution (the record's solutions) or workaround (its workarounds, read only where its solutions name no fix: a temporary measure the CNA lists beside its fix). A workaround's sentence is the record's workaround, never its solution. Present whenever cna_solution is; absent from an API older than the field." + }, "cpe_configurations": { "anyOf": [ { - "description": "true: EchelonGraph holds evidence of a fix for the CVE, its sources named in patch_evidence. false: no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Once true it is never set back to false. An answer with no patch_evidence (an API older than that field) does not name the evidence, and a false there is not a finding that no fix exists either.", + "description": "true: EchelonGraph holds, or once held, evidence of a fix for the CVE; patch_evidence names the sources it holds now. true beside an empty patch_evidence means evidence of a fix once held has since been withdrawn (patch_available is never set back to false), and fix_status (remediation.fix_status in the CVE's record) is the current reading, not patch_available. false: no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. An answer with no patch_evidence (an API older than that field) does not name the evidence, and a false there is not a finding that no fix exists either.", "type": [ "boolean", "null" - "description_fix" + "description_fix", + "vendor_fix_released" ], "type": "string" }, - "description": "The sources of the fix evidence EchelonGraph holds for the CVE, strongest first: vendor_patch (a vendor patch on record, from Ubuntu or Red Hat), fixed_version (a fixed version recorded for an affected package, or the fixed bound of an affected version range), release_reference (a reference that EchelonGraph confirmed through the GitHub API is a published release containing the fix, or a pull request or commit that a published release contains), vendor_advisory_fix (a vendor advisory that lists a fix for the CVE under the vendor's own structured category: Red Hat's CSAF vendor_fix, Microsoft's Vendor Fix), nvd_patch_reference (an NVD reference tagged Patch), cna_patch_reference (a reference the CVE's CNA tagged patch in its CVE record), cna_solution (a sentence of the CVE record's solutions, written by its CNA, that names a fixed version; relayed as cna_solution) and description_fix (a sentence of the CVE description that names a fixed version). Empty where none was found when EchelonGraph last computed it. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not name the evidence." + "description": "The sources of the fix evidence EchelonGraph holds for the CVE, strongest first: vendor_patch (a vendor patch on record, from Ubuntu or Red Hat), fixed_version (a fixed version recorded for an affected package, or the fixed bound of an affected version range), release_reference (a reference that EchelonGraph confirmed through the GitHub API is a published release containing the fix, or a pull request or commit that a published release contains), vendor_advisory_fix (a vendor advisory that lists a fix for the CVE under the vendor's own structured category: Red Hat's CSAF vendor_fix, Microsoft's Vendor Fix), nvd_patch_reference (an NVD reference tagged Patch), cna_patch_reference (a reference the CVE's CNA tagged patch in its CVE record), cna_solution (a sentence of the CVE record's solutions or workarounds, written by its CNA, that names a fixed version; relayed as cna_solution), description_fix (a sentence of the CVE description that names a fixed version) and vendor_fix_released (the vendor states, in the CVE record, that a fix is released and the record names no fixed version; check the vendor's advisory). Empty where none was found when EchelonGraph last computed it. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not name the evidence." }, "published": { "type": [ + "section": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "statement": { "type": [ "string", + }, + "vendor_released": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "statement": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] } }, "type": "object" - "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read." + "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read. vendor_released (basis vendor_fix_released) is the vendor's own statement that a fix is released where the CVE record names no fixed version: its sentence, verbatim (statement, or null), never a version, so the fixed release is the vendor advisory's to name. solution_by's section is workarounds when the fix sentence is the record's workaround, not its solution." } }, "type": "object"
--- pinned/get_cwe +++ observed/get_cwe { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/get_vendor_advisory +++ observed/get_vendor_advisory { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/kev_recent +++ observed/kev_recent { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/scan_manifest +++ observed/scan_manifest { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [ + "matches_truncated": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "description": "Present only on a row whose matches the structured result's cut (DATA CUT) shortened or left out: total, the row's matches in the answer; returned, the ones data keeps (its first, highest effective_score first); and, while they fit, of all its matches, the CVE IDs KEV-listed (kev_listed_cve_ids) or used in ransomware (ransomware_cve_ids), and the distinct fixed_in versions (fixed_in_versions). The same call with full: true returns every match.", + "properties": { + "fixed_in_versions": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "kev_listed_cve_ids": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "ransomware_cve_ids": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, "not_affected_count": { "type": [ "number",
--- pinned/search_cves +++ observed/search_cves { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Search/list CVEs from EchelonGraph's CVE feed (NVD + MITRE-CNA pre-NVD + CISA-KEV + EPSS + GitHub GHSA, each polled on a schedule). Filter by severity, minimum CVSS, free text, and sort; page with limit and offset. Returns cves, each with cve_id, severity, cvss_v3_score, echelongraph_score and score_assessed (whether EchelonGraph has scored it), epss_score and kev_listed where the record has them, and the list's total, total_counted (false: total is not a count), total_is_lower_bound (true: at least total), search_relaxed, limit and offset. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds evidence of a fix for the CVE, and patch_evidence names its sources, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps at least the fields named above and the first 200 characters of its description (100 on a page too long for that), or rows are left out and the note gives the offset to call next.", + "description": "Search/list CVEs from EchelonGraph's CVE feed (NVD + MITRE-CNA pre-NVD + CISA-KEV + EPSS + GitHub GHSA, each polled on a schedule). Filter by severity, minimum CVSS, free text, and sort; page with limit and offset. Returns cves, each with cve_id, severity, cvss_v3_score, echelongraph_score and score_assessed (whether EchelonGraph has scored it), epss_score and kev_listed where the record has them, and the list's total, total_counted (false: total is not a count), total_is_lower_bound (true: at least total), search_relaxed, limit and offset. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds, or once held, fix evidence for the CVE; patch_evidence is what it holds now, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps at least the fields named above and the first 200 characters of its description (100 on a page too long for that), or rows are left out and the note gives the offset to call next.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [ - "description": "The sentence of the CVE record's solutions, written by its CNA, that names a released fix, verbatim: what makes cna_solution patch evidence. It is the CNA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. Absent where the record's solutions name no fixed version, as well as where the field itself is: Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field.", + "description": "The sentence of the CVE record's solutions or workarounds, written by its CNA, that names a released fix, verbatim: what makes cna_solution patch evidence. It is the CNA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. cna_solution_section says which of the two sections it is. Absent where the record's solutions name no fixed version, as well as where the field itself is: Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "cna_solution_section": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "solution", + "workaround" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "Which section of the CVE record cna_solution was read from: solution (the record's solutions) or workaround (its workarounds, read only where its solutions name no fix: a temporary measure the CNA lists beside its fix). A workaround's sentence is the record's workaround, never its solution. Present whenever cna_solution is; absent from an API older than the field." + }, "cpe_configurations": { "anyOf": [ { - "description": "true: EchelonGraph holds evidence of a fix for the CVE, its sources named in patch_evidence. false: no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Once true it is never set back to false. An answer with no patch_evidence (an API older than that field) does not name the evidence, and a false there is not a finding that no fix exists either.", + "description": "true: EchelonGraph holds, or once held, evidence of a fix for the CVE; patch_evidence names the sources it holds now. true beside an empty patch_evidence means evidence of a fix once held has since been withdrawn (patch_available is never set back to false), and fix_status (remediation.fix_status in the CVE's record) is the current reading, not patch_available. false: no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. An answer with no patch_evidence (an API older than that field) does not name the evidence, and a false there is not a finding that no fix exists either.", "type": [ "boolean", "null" - "description_fix" + "description_fix", + "vendor_fix_released" ], "type": "string" }, - "description": "The sources of the fix evidence EchelonGraph holds for the CVE, strongest first: vendor_patch (a vendor patch on record, from Ubuntu or Red Hat), fixed_version (a fixed version recorded for an affected package, or the fixed bound of an affected version range), release_reference (a reference that EchelonGraph confirmed through the GitHub API is a published release containing the fix, or a pull request or commit that a published release contains), vendor_advisory_fix (a vendor advisory that lists a fix for the CVE under the vendor's own structured category: Red Hat's CSAF vendor_fix, Microsoft's Vendor Fix), nvd_patch_reference (an NVD reference tagged Patch), cna_patch_reference (a reference the CVE's CNA tagged patch in its CVE record), cna_solution (a sentence of the CVE record's solutions, written by its CNA, that names a fixed version; relayed as cna_solution) and description_fix (a sentence of the CVE description that names a fixed version). Empty where none was found when EchelonGraph last computed it. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not name the evidence." + "description": "The sources of the fix evidence EchelonGraph holds for the CVE, strongest first: vendor_patch (a vendor patch on record, from Ubuntu or Red Hat), fixed_version (a fixed version recorded for an affected package, or the fixed bound of an affected version range), release_reference (a reference that EchelonGraph confirmed through the GitHub API is a published release containing the fix, or a pull request or commit that a published release contains), vendor_advisory_fix (a vendor advisory that lists a fix for the CVE under the vendor's own structured category: Red Hat's CSAF vendor_fix, Microsoft's Vendor Fix), nvd_patch_reference (an NVD reference tagged Patch), cna_patch_reference (a reference the CVE's CNA tagged patch in its CVE record), cna_solution (a sentence of the CVE record's solutions or workarounds, written by its CNA, that names a fixed version; relayed as cna_solution), description_fix (a sentence of the CVE description that names a fixed version) and vendor_fix_released (the vendor states, in the CVE record, that a fix is released and the record names no fixed version; check the vendor's advisory). Empty where none was found when EchelonGraph last computed it. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not name the evidence." }, "published": { "type": [ + "section": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "statement": { "type": [ "string", + }, + "vendor_released": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "statement": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] } }, "type": "object" - "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read." + "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read. vendor_released (basis vendor_fix_released) is the vendor's own statement that a fix is released where the CVE record names no fixed version: its sentence, verbatim (statement, or null), never a version, so the fixed release is the vendor advisory's to name. solution_by's section is workarounds when the fix sentence is the record's workaround, not its solution." } }, "type": "object"
--- pinned/search_vendor_advisories +++ observed/search_vendor_advisories { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
--- pinned/vendor_advisories_for_cve +++ observed/vendor_advisories_for_cve { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "additionalProperties": false, + "additionalProperties": {}, "properties": { "coverage": { "anyOf": [
Changed 2026-10-12 15:20 UTC
16 descriptions rewritten.
--- pinned/check_affected +++ observed/check_affected { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Whether a product or package at a given version is affected by known CVEs, from the same matcher as echelongraph.io/am-i-affected. The CPE path takes product (an NVD CPE product token, such as openssl or nginx) and version, and returns the CVEs whose NVD CPE match criteria include that product at that version; each match names the vendor NVD asserts (cpe_vendor) and whether it was verified (vendor_unknown). The registry path takes ecosystem (npm, PyPI, Maven and other OSV ecosystem names), package and version, and decides each OSV advisory EchelonGraph holds for that package as affected, not affected or undetermined. count depends on assessed: assessed false means the lookup did not evaluate this component, not_assessed_reason says why, and a count of 0 there is not a finding of not affected. An advisory undecidable at this version is reported as undetermined (undetermined_count, and up to 50 of them in undetermined), never as safe. Each match carries cve_id, kev_listed, ransomware, epss_score, effective_score, effective_severity and score_assessed (false: not yet scored, so echelongraph_score is withheld). A registry match also carries interval, the advisory interval holding this version, and fixed_in, its fixed bound, or null with fixed_in_reason; a CPE match carries no fixed_in. All four inputs travel in request headers, never in the URL. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, the excluded and undetermined samples keep their first 10 entries, each its cve_id and reason, cve_ids keeps its first 10, and each match keeps cve_id, kev_listed, ransomware, epss_score, effective_score, score_assessed and fixed_in at least. Every CPE match stays in the text; near the cap, a registry list's last matches can leave it, and the note says how many.", + "description": "Whether a product or package at a given version is affected by known CVEs, from the same matcher as echelongraph.io/am-i-affected. The CPE path takes product (an NVD CPE product token, such as nginx) and version, and returns the CVEs whose NVD CPE match criteria include that product at that version; each match names the vendor NVD asserts (cpe_vendor) and whether it was verified (vendor_unknown). The registry path takes ecosystem (npm, PyPI, Maven and other OSV ecosystem names), package and version, and decides each OSV advisory EchelonGraph holds for that package as affected, not affected or undetermined. count depends on assessed: assessed false means the lookup did not evaluate this component, not_assessed_reason says why, and a count of 0 there is not a finding of not affected. An advisory undecidable at this version is reported as undetermined (undetermined_count, and up to 50 of them in undetermined), never as safe. Each match carries cve_id, kev_listed, ransomware, epss_score, effective_score, effective_severity and score_assessed (false: not yet scored, so echelongraph_score is withheld). A registry match also carries interval, the advisory interval holding it, and fixed_in, the lowest unaffected version above it, or null with fixed_in_reason; a CPE match carries no fixed_in. All four inputs travel in request headers, never in the URL. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, the excluded and undetermined samples keep their first 10 entries, each its cve_id and reason, cve_ids keeps its first 10, and each match keeps cve_id, kev_listed, ransomware, epss_score, effective_score, score_assessed and fixed_in at least. Every CPE match stays in the text; near the cap, a registry list's last matches can leave it, and the note says how many.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "package": { "description": "Registry path: the package name in that ecosystem, such as lodash.", "type": "string" - "description": "Registry match: the fixed bound of the advisory interval that holds this version, always above it. null when that interval records no fix (it ends at last_affected, or has no end) or no interval holds the version, with fixed_in_reason saying which. Absent on a CPE match.", + "description": "Registry match: the lowest version above this one that no affected interval of the CVE's record for the package holds, always above it: the fixed bound of the interval that holds this version, moved past any overlapping interval that still holds that bound (fixed_in_detail then names it). null when no such version is on record (an interval on the way records no fix: it ends at last_affected, or has no end) or no interval holds the version, with fixed_in_reason saying which. Absent on a CPE match.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "fixed_in_detail": { + "description": "Set when fixed_in is not the fixed bound of the interval that holds this version: the overlapping intervals of the same record it moved past, which still hold that bound.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "fixed_in_reason": { "description": "Why fixed_in is null; absent when fixed_in is a version.", "type": [ + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/check_sbom +++ observed/check_sbom { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Check a dependency list against EchelonGraph's advisory corpus, one verdict per component. For container images and Kubernetes pods, the input is an SBOM of each image, or its purls. Pass purls (package URLs, up to 2,000 distinct) or sbom (a CycloneDX or SPDX JSON document, up to 5,000,000 characters). This server reads the purls from the document; only they are sent to the API, in POST bodies of at most 200, never in a URL; the document itself is not sent on. Run from npm, this server is on your machine; over the hosted endpoint (mcp.echelongraph.io) it is EchelonGraph's, and the document is the request body, accepted up to 6 MiB. data.results holds one row per component sent, in order, with verdict (affected, not_affected, undetermined or not_assessed), not_assessed_reason, cve_ids, matched_package and matched_via (a deb or apk purl's upstream qualifier matches as its source package); each match carries fixed_in (its interval's fixed bound) or null with fixed_in_reason. data.summary counts the verdicts. not_affected is the only clean verdict: not_assessed (no verdict, as for a deb, apk or rpm purl without a distro qualifier naming its release, which EchelonGraph does not guess) and undetermined are not, and the note counts both. The API allows 1,200 components a minute per caller; on a 429 the tool waits out Retry-After, up to 50 seconds a call, then answers what it has, the rest in data.not_sent_purls, unchecked and not clean. Input with more than 2,000 distinct purls is refused, not truncated. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, each row keeps index, purl, verdict, not_assessed_reason and cve_ids at least, each match its fixed_in while kept; not_affected rows leave the text first, then not_assessed ones; not_sent_purls keeps its first 10.", + "description": "Check a dependency list against EchelonGraph's advisory corpus, one verdict per component. For container images and Kubernetes pods, the input is an SBOM of each image, or its purls. Pass purls (package URLs, up to 2,000 distinct) or sbom (a CycloneDX or SPDX JSON document, up to 5,000,000 characters). This server reads the purls from the document; only they are sent to the API, in POST bodies of at most 200, never in a URL; the document itself is not sent on. Run from npm, this server is on your machine; over the hosted endpoint (mcp.echelongraph.io) it is EchelonGraph's, and the document is the request body, accepted up to 6 MiB. data.results holds one row per component sent, in order, with verdict (affected, not_affected, undetermined or not_assessed), not_assessed_reason, cve_ids, matched_package and matched_via (a deb or apk purl's upstream qualifier matches as its source package); each match carries fixed_in (the next unaffected version) or null with fixed_in_reason. data.summary counts the verdicts. not_affected is the only clean verdict: not_assessed (no verdict, as for a deb, apk or rpm purl without a distro qualifier naming its release, which EchelonGraph does not guess) and undetermined are not, and the note counts both. The API allows 1,200 components a minute per caller; on a 429 the tool waits out Retry-After, up to 50 seconds a call, then answers what it has, the rest in data.not_sent_purls, unchecked and not clean. Input with more than 2,000 distinct purls is refused, not truncated. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps index, purl, verdict, not_assessed_reason and cve_ids at least, each match its fixed_in while kept; not_affected rows leave the text first, then not_assessed ones; not_sent_purls keeps its first 10.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "purls": { "description": "package URLs to check, e.g. pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.20 or pkg:deb/debian/openssl@3.0.11-1~deb12u1?distro=debian-12 (up to 2,000 distinct, sent in batches of 200)", "items": { - "description": "The fixed bound of the advisory interval that holds this component's version, always above it. null when that interval records no fix (it ends at last_affected, or has no end) or no interval holds the version, with fixed_in_reason saying which.", + "description": "The lowest version above this component's that no affected interval of the CVE's record for the package holds, always above it: the fixed bound of the interval that holds the component's version, moved past any overlapping interval that still holds that bound (fixed_in_detail then names it). null when no such version is on record (an interval on the way records no fix: it ends at last_affected, or has no end) or no interval holds the version, with fixed_in_reason saying which.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "fixed_in_detail": { + "description": "Set when fixed_in is not the fixed bound of the interval that holds the component's version: the overlapping intervals of the same record it moved past, which still hold that bound.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "fixed_in_reason": { "description": "Why fixed_in is null; absent when fixed_in is a version.", "type": [ - "description": "Why the advisory applies, with the advisory interval the version falls inside: \"[A, B)\" names the fixed version B, \"[A, B]\" the last affected version B. On an upstream row it ends by naming the source package and the purl name.", + "description": "Why the advisory applies, with the advisory interval the version falls inside: \"[A, B)\" names that interval's fixed bound B (another interval of the advisory can still hold B; fixed_in is the version past them all), \"[A, B]\" the last affected version B. On an upstream row it ends by naming the source package and the purl name.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/cve_exposure +++ observed/cve_exposure { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Internet-exposure footprint for one CVE from EchelonGraph's KEV-exposure radar: how many internet-facing services (distinct ip:port, returned as exposed_hosts; a machine answering on two ports counts twice) the radar has on record running a version its CVE matcher maps to this CVE, with a country/product breakdown and a ransomware flag. Aggregate and host-redacted; free and keyless. Method: exposure counts are derived from Shodan data. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan). Every 12 h, when Shodan query credits allow, the radar runs one Shodan query per tracked product, reads up to 100 ip:port services per query, and keeps a service when its banner version matches a CISA-KEV or high-EPSS CVE; a service whose row has not been written or refreshed for 21 days is dropped. The radar only looks for its tracked set of CVEs: for a CVE outside that set the note says NOT ASSESSED (exposure_state not_assessed), and its 0 is not a measurement. last_seen is when EchelonGraph last wrote or refreshed a service's row, not when the service was observed: a port still listed by Shodan InternetDB refreshes it without re-reading the banner, so a patched service can stay counted while its port stays open. A count is therefore a banner-version inference over a sample, not an exploit test and not an internet-wide census. Its structured result's state is not_assessed with measured_at null, since the answer dates no observation; the count is still relayed, labelled, as what the radar holds on record. exposure_state says what the count is: exposed, measured_zero, not_assessed or tracking_unknown; coverage.in_scope is the API's tracked verdict; freshness is null; data is the API's JSON. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", + "description": "Internet-exposure footprint for one CVE from EchelonGraph's KEV-exposure radar: how many internet-facing services (distinct ip:port, returned as exposed_hosts; a machine answering on two ports counts twice) the radar has on record running a version its CVE matcher maps to this CVE, with a country/product breakdown and a ransomware flag. Aggregate and host-redacted; free and keyless. Method: exposure counts are derived from Shodan data. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan). Every 12 h, when Shodan query credits allow, the radar runs one Shodan query per tracked product, reads up to 100 ip:port services per query, and keeps a service when its banner version matches a CISA-KEV or high-EPSS CVE; a service whose row has not been written or refreshed for 21 days is dropped. The radar only looks for its tracked set of CVEs: for a CVE outside that set the note says NOT ASSESSED (exposure_state not_assessed), and its 0 is not a measurement. last_seen is when EchelonGraph last wrote or refreshed a service's row, not when the service was observed: a port still listed by Shodan InternetDB refreshes it without re-reading the banner, so a patched service can stay counted while its port stays open. A count is therefore a banner-version inference over a sample, not an exploit test and not an internet-wide census. Its structured result's state is not_assessed with measured_at null, since the answer dates no observation; the count is still relayed, labelled, as what the radar holds on record. exposure_state says what the count is: exposed, measured_zero, not_assessed or tracking_unknown; coverage.in_scope is the API's tracked verdict; freshness is null; data is the API's JSON. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + }, + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "exposure_state": { "anyOf": [ { + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/cve_intel +++ observed/cve_intel { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Weakness, public exploit code, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, source_published_at (the source's date, null if none), eg_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph recorded it) and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total, exploits_capped, exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version, fixed_branches), fixed_versions (each fixed version with the vulnerable_range it fixes) and timeline (the newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). fixed_branches lists each affected range on record (introduced, and fixed or last_affected, with advisory_id (its OSV record) and source); in the ecosystem's version order, a version is in a range when it is at or above introduced (\"0\" is the first version) and below fixed, or at or below last_affected; that range's fixed is the fix for it. fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility, not the fix for every affected range. fixed_branches [] is not a finding that no fix exists. verified_status is the source's label, not a guarantee the exploit works on a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Its structured result carries notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; its coverage names the sections relayed, failed and left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", + "description": "Weakness, public exploit code, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, source_published_at (the source's date, null if none), eg_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph recorded it) and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total, exploits_capped, exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version, fixed_branches), fixed_versions (each fixed version with the vulnerable_range it fixes) and timeline (the newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). fixed_branches lists each affected range on record (from introduced (\"0\" is the first version) to below fixed, or through last_affected, with advisory_id (its OSV record) and source); in the ecosystem's version order, an affected version's fix is the first fixed above it that no range of its row holds (none past a range with no fixed). fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility, not the fix for every affected range. fixed_branches [] is not a finding that no fix exists. verified_status is the source's label, not a guarantee the exploit works on a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Its structured result carries notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; its coverage names the sections relayed, failed and left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + }, + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" } }, "required": [ - "description": "fixed_branches lists each affected range of the package on record: introduced, and fixed (the range's fix) or last_affected (its last affected version, where no fix is on record), each null when absent, with advisory_id (the OSV record that published the range) and source (the loader's label for that record), both null on a row loaded before they were stored. Ranges with an advisory_id are in the order their record lists them (records in id order); ranges without one are oldest first. To pick the range for an installed version, compare in the ecosystem's version order (release numbers part by part, as numbers: 2.4 is below 2.13.0): the version is in a range when it is at or above introduced (\"0\" is the first version) and below fixed, or at or below last_affected; that range's fixed is the fix for it, and a version in no range is outside every range on record. fixed_branches is null where the package's ranges were never loaded, and [] where no version range is on record (the advisory gives none, only commit ranges, or more than are stored), which is not a finding that no fix exists: fixed_version can still name one. fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility (one per package: the range the loader kept, the advisory's last as a rule), not the fix for every affected range: for CVE-2021-44228, its advisory gives log4j-core three ranges, and fixed_version 2.12.2 is the fix for the one from 2.4, while the range holding 2.14.1 (from 2.13.0) is fixed in 2.15.0." + "description": "fixed_branches lists each affected range of the package on record: introduced, and fixed (the range's fix) or last_affected (its last affected version, where no fix is on record), each null when absent, with advisory_id (the OSV record that published the range) and source (the loader's label for that record), both null on a row loaded before they were stored. Ranges with an advisory_id are in the order their record lists them (records in id order); ranges without one are oldest first. To pick the range for an installed version, compare in the ecosystem's version order (release numbers part by part, as numbers: 2.4 is below 2.13.0): the version is in a range when it is at or above introduced (\"0\" is the first version) and below fixed, or at or below last_affected; its fix is that range's fixed, or, while another range still holds that, the other range's fixed (none past a range without one); a version in no range is outside every range on record. fixed_branches is null where the package's ranges were never loaded, and [] where no version range is on record (the advisory gives none, only commit ranges, or more than are stored), which is not a finding that no fix exists: fixed_version can still name one. fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility (one per package: the range the loader kept, the advisory's last as a rule), not the fix for every affected range: for CVE-2021-44228, its advisory gives log4j-core three ranges, and fixed_version 2.12.2 is the fix for the one from 2.4, while the range holding 2.14.1 (from 2.13.0) is fixed in 2.15.0." }, "fixed_version": { "description": "One range's fix, kept for compatibility; not the fix for every affected range: read fixed_branches.", + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/cve_remediation +++ observed/cve_remediation { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "How one CVE is fixed, as its sources state it, in one answer. Every text is relayed as stated by its source; EchelonGraph has not tested it. An empty list or a remediation_state of none_in_source or not_parsed is not a finding that no fix exists. Returns cisa (kev_listed, and for a KEV-listed CVE CISA's required_action, due_date, short_description and notes_urls, verbatim; CISA's required_action is directed at US federal civilian agencies (BOD 22-01) and is not EchelonGraph's advice.), fixed_branches (each affected package with fixed_branches: every affected range, introduced and fixed or last_affected, and fixed_version, one range's fix), vendor_remediations (each vendor advisory naming the CVE, newest first, at most 20: vendor, vendor_advisory_id, remediation_state, remediation_kinds and items, each item with kind, source_category, text, url, fixed_build, product_ids and product_count), fix_references (the record's references NVD tagged Patch or Mitigation), patches, coverage (parsed_vendors, vendors_not_parsed and the caps) and failed_sections. kind is the vendor's own category, never read from the text: vendor_fix, workaround, mitigation, no_fix_planned, none_available, or other with the vendor's name for it in source_category. remediation_state is parsed, none_in_source (parsed; the advisory lists none for this CVE), not_parsed (EchelonGraph does not read that vendor's remediation) or withdrawn. A section the API could not read is named in failed_sections and coverage.sections_failed, never relayed as empty. A REJECTED CVE answers not_assessed. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2021-44228. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, vendor texts are shortened first; kinds, states and URLs are kept.", + "description": "How one CVE is fixed, as its sources state it, in one answer. Every text is relayed as stated by its source; EchelonGraph has not tested it. An empty list or a remediation_state of none_in_source or not_parsed is not a finding that no fix exists. Returns fix_status (the API's fix-status rule, as CVE Pulse shows it: state and basis), cisa (for a KEV-listed CVE CISA's required_action, due_date, short_description and notes_urls, verbatim; CISA's required_action is directed at US federal civilian agencies (under BOD 26-04, which replaced BOD 22-01 on 10 June 2026) and is not EchelonGraph's advice.), fixed_branches (each affected package with fixed_branches: every affected range, introduced and fixed or last_affected, and fixed_version, one range's fix), vendor_remediations (each vendor advisory naming the CVE, newest first, at most 20, with remediation_state, remediation_kinds and items, each with kind, source_category, text and url), fix_references (references NVD or the CNA tagged Patch or Mitigation), patches, coverage and failed_sections. kind is the vendor's own category, never read from the text: vendor_fix, workaround, mitigation, no_fix_planned, none_available or other. remediation_state is parsed, none_in_source (none listed for this CVE), not_parsed (that vendor's remediation is not read) or withdrawn. ecosystem, package and version (all three or none, sent in request headers, never in the URL) add installed, the verdict at that version, and fixed_in, the lowest unaffected version above it, or null with fixed_in_reason. A section the API could not read is named in failed_sections, not relayed as empty. A REJECTED CVE answers not_assessed. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, vendor texts are shortened first; kinds, states and URLs are kept.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + }, + "ecosystem": { + "description": "Installed version, with package and version: the package's ecosystem, such as npm, PyPI or Maven. Sent in a request header.", + "type": "string" + }, + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "package": { + "description": "Installed version, with ecosystem and version: the package name in that ecosystem, such as org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-core. Sent in a request header.", + "type": "string" + }, + "version": { + "description": "Installed version, with ecosystem and package: the version installed, such as 2.14.1. Sent in a request header.", + "type": "string" } }, "required": [ + "installed_asked": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "ecosystem": { + "type": "string" + }, + "package": { + "type": "string" + }, + "version": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "ecosystem", + "package", + "version" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The installed version this call sent (in request headers), as given; null when none." + }, "item_text_cap": { "type": [ "number", - "items_per_advisory_cap" + "items_per_advisory_cap", + "installed_asked" ], "type": "object" }, - "description": "CISA's requiredAction, verbatim. CISA's required_action is directed at US federal civilian agencies (BOD 22-01) and is not EchelonGraph's advice.", + "description": "CISA's requiredAction, verbatim. CISA's required_action is directed at US federal civilian agencies (under BOD 26-04, which replaced BOD 22-01 on 10 June 2026) and is not EchelonGraph's advice.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "fix_status": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "basis": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "described_by": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "listed_in_patch_table": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "solution_by": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "cna": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "statement": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "state": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "available", + "fix_referenced", + "fix_merged", + "none_confirmed", + "unknown" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "stated_in_record": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "unread_inputs": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read." + }, "fixed_branches": { "anyOf": [ { + "fixed_in": { + "description": "With an installed version: the first version above it that no affected range on record holds, always above it, as the advisory states it: the fixed bound of the range holding it, moved past any overlapping range that still holds that bound (fixed_in_detail then names it). null when no range on record holds it, no fix is on record past the ranges holding it, or the version was not assessed, with fixed_in_reason saying which. Absent when no installed version was asked.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "fixed_in_detail": { + "description": "Set when fixed_in is not the fixed bound of the range holding the installed version: the overlapping ranges of the same record it moved past, which still hold that bound.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "fixed_in_reason": { + "description": "Why fixed_in is null; absent when fixed_in is a version.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "installed": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "ecosystem": { + "description": "The ecosystem asked for, in its canonical OSV spelling.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "ecosystem_recognised": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "interval": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "fixed": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "introduced": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "last_affected": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The affected range holding the version (fixed is exclusive, last_affected inclusive); absent when none holds it." + }, + "package": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "verdict": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "affected", + "not_affected", + "undetermined", + "not_assessed" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "affected (a range on record holds the version), not_affected (no range on record holds it), undetermined (a range could not be decided at it) or not_assessed (the record names no such package for this CVE, or the lookup did not run)." + }, + "version": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "version_evidence": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The installed version asked for, as the API read it from the request headers, and its verdict against this CVE; absent when none was asked." + }, "not_assessed_reason": { "type": [ "string", + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object" + "installed_asked": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "ecosystem": { + "type": "string" + }, + "package": { + "type": "string" + }, + "version": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "ecosystem", + "package", + "version" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The installed version this call sent (in request headers), as given; null when none." + }, "item_text_cap": { "type": [ "number", - "items_per_advisory_cap" + "items_per_advisory_cap", + "installed_asked" ], "type": "object" },
--- pinned/cve_summary +++ observed/cve_summary { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Summary of EchelonGraph's CVE Pulse feed: summary.total active CVEs, their counts by severity band (summary.critical, summary.high, summary.medium, summary.low), the count with no band (summary.none), and summary.last_updated, the newest modification time among those records. summary.none is not a severity rating of None: it counts the active CVEs with no severity band from any source, that is, CVEs not yet scored, and the answer may carry the same count again as summary.unscored. Whenever summary.none is above zero the note says so, and names those CVEs not yet scored, not CVEs rated None. summary.nvd_critical, summary.nvd_high, summary.nvd_medium, summary.nvd_low and summary.nvd_none count the same active CVEs as summary.total by NVD's CVSS severity label: provenance, never EchelonGraph's severity band. summary.nvd_none is neither a count of CVEs rated None nor the count of CVEs with no severity, which is summary.none. summary.rejected counts the CVE records rejected (withdrawn) by their numbering authority, which summary.total and the other counts above leave out: they are withdrawn records, none of them a vulnerability. poller holds the in-memory counters of the NVD poller of the one API instance that answered, counted since that instance last started and zeroed on every restart: they describe that instance, never the feed's size, intake, reliability or freshness. Whenever the answer carries poller the note says so. The feed is polled from its sources on a schedule; this is the state as of that update. Its structured result's state is measured, with freshness null (the feed serves no poll-completion time) and data equal to the API's JSON less each poller field (or the whole poller) the note names as left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", + "description": "Summary of EchelonGraph's CVE Pulse feed: summary.total active CVEs, their counts by severity band (summary.critical, summary.high, summary.medium, summary.low), the count with no band (summary.none), and summary.last_updated, the newest modification time among those records. summary.none is not a severity rating of None: it counts the active CVEs with no severity band from any source, that is, CVEs not yet scored, and the answer may carry the same count again as summary.unscored. Whenever summary.none is above zero the note says so, and names those CVEs not yet scored, not CVEs rated None. summary.nvd_critical, summary.nvd_high, summary.nvd_medium, summary.nvd_low and summary.nvd_none count the same active CVEs as summary.total by NVD's CVSS severity label: provenance, never EchelonGraph's severity band. summary.nvd_none is neither a count of CVEs rated None nor the count of CVEs with no severity, which is summary.none. summary.rejected counts the CVE records rejected (withdrawn) by their numbering authority, which summary.total and the other counts above leave out: they are withdrawn records, none of them a vulnerability. poller holds the in-memory counters of the NVD poller of the one API instance that answered, counted since that instance last started and zeroed on every restart: they describe that instance, never the feed's size, intake, reliability or freshness. Whenever the answer carries poller the note says so. The feed is polled from its sources on a schedule; this is the state as of that update. Its structured result's state is measured, with freshness null (the feed serves no poll-completion time) and data equal to the API's JSON less each poller field (or the whole poller) the note names as left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { - "properties": {}, + "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", + "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + } + }, "type": "object" }, "name": "cve_summary", + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/epss_history +++ observed/epss_history { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "How one CVE's EPSS score (FIRST's exploit-prediction probability, 0 to 1, with its percentile) has changed, as EchelonGraph recorded it: points, oldest first, each with at, epss_score, epss_percentile and score_date (FIRST's score date, null where the record does not hold it); current, the record's value now (epss_score, epss_percentile, epss_updated_at); series_kind, always change_only; series_starts_at, when EchelonGraph began recording EPSS changes for any CVE; complete_since, from when the record holds every change; coverage, which FIRST score dates the record holds; history_rows, points_truncated and latest_point_matches_current. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. The series is change-only: a point is a recorded change, and a day without a point is not a recorded value. A daily series interpolated from it holds values EchelonGraph never recorded, so the series is never a daily series. Before series_starts_at nothing was recorded, so a missing point there means not recorded, not unchanged, and the value in force before a CVE's first point is not in the series. Between series_starts_at and complete_since the record misses changes, so a missing point there does not mean unchanged either; only from complete_since on is every change a point. coverage.days_missing and coverage.days_partial name the FIRST score dates the record does not hold, or holds for some CVEs only. latest_point_matches_current false means a change is missing from the series. Its structured result's measured_at is current.epss_updated_at (when EchelonGraph last wrote a changed value, not FIRST's score date), its coverage says which part of the record is complete and which score dates it holds, and its freshness is null. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", + "description": "How one CVE's EPSS score (FIRST's exploit-prediction probability, 0 to 1, with its percentile) has changed, as EchelonGraph recorded it: points, oldest first, each with at, epss_score, epss_percentile and score_date (FIRST's score date, null where the record does not hold it); current, the record's value now (epss_score, epss_percentile, epss_updated_at); series_kind, always change_only; series_starts_at, when EchelonGraph began recording EPSS changes for any CVE; complete_since, from when the record holds every change; coverage, which FIRST score dates the record holds; history_rows, points_truncated and latest_point_matches_current. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. The series is change-only: a point is a recorded change, and a day without a point is not a recorded value. A daily series interpolated from it holds values EchelonGraph never recorded, so the series is never a daily series. Before series_starts_at nothing was recorded, so a missing point there means not recorded, not unchanged, and the value in force before a CVE's first point is not in the series. Between series_starts_at and complete_since the record misses changes, so a missing point there does not mean unchanged either; only from complete_since on is every change a point. coverage.days_missing and coverage.days_partial name the FIRST score dates the record does not hold, or holds for some CVEs only. latest_point_matches_current false means a change is missing from the series. Its structured result's measured_at is current.epss_updated_at (when EchelonGraph last wrote a changed value, not FIRST's score date), its coverage says which part of the record is complete and which score dates it holds, and its freshness is null. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + }, + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/exposure_radar +++ observed/exposure_radar { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Aggregate totals from EchelonGraph's internet-exposure radars: kev_exposure, internet-facing services running actively-exploited (CISA-KEV) CVEs, plus the ransomware-linked subset, derived from Shodan data; exposed_databases, unauthenticated data stores and observability UIs, found through Shodan (LeakIX when Shodan query credits run low) and then confirmed by EchelonGraph's own identified check (not a pure read: on Redis it names its client, and on ClickHouse its query is recorded in the server's query log); leaked_credentials, sampled from public GitHub push events; and shadow_ai, services found through Certificate Transparency logs and Shodan and then checked by EchelonGraph's identified probes. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan). It also gives MCP-server counts: hostnames named like an MCP server in EchelonGraph's own Certificate Transparency feed (no Shodan data), each counted once by its latest verdict from EchelonGraph's identified MCP probe, which never sends tools/call. Service counts are distinct ip:port services, not machines. The result's note, and the outputSchema's description of each radar, label every number by what it counts. Of the shadow_ai numbers, only confirmed_exposed counts exposed services. A kev_exposure.newest_kev CVE whose exposure_state is not_assessed has no measurement in the answer: its 0 is not one. Its structured result's state is not_assessed with measured_at null, since no radar dates what it counts; each count is still relayed as what that radar holds on record. freshness gives each radar's last_run_at where the API serves one; coverage names the radars that answered. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", + "description": "Aggregate totals from EchelonGraph's internet-exposure radars: kev_exposure, internet-facing services running actively-exploited (CISA-KEV) CVEs, plus the ransomware-linked subset, derived from Shodan data; exposed_databases, unauthenticated data stores and observability UIs, found through Shodan (LeakIX when Shodan query credits run low) and then confirmed by EchelonGraph's own identified check (not a pure read: on Redis it names its client, and on ClickHouse its query is recorded in the server's query log); leaked_credentials, sampled from public GitHub push events; and shadow_ai, services found through Certificate Transparency logs and Shodan and then checked by EchelonGraph's identified probes. Shodan data is owned by Shodan, which holds its copyright (© Shodan). It also gives MCP-server counts: hostnames named like an MCP server in EchelonGraph's own Certificate Transparency feed (no Shodan data), each counted once by its latest verdict from EchelonGraph's identified MCP probe, which never sends tools/call. Service counts are distinct ip:port services, not machines. The result's note, and the outputSchema's description of each radar, label every number by what it counts. Of the shadow_ai numbers, only confirmed_exposed counts exposed services. A kev_exposure.newest_kev CVE whose exposure_state is not_assessed has no measurement in the answer: its 0 is not one. Its structured result's state is not_assessed with measured_at null, since no radar dates what it counts; each count is still relayed as what that radar holds on record. freshness gives each radar's last_run_at where the API serves one; coverage names the radars that answered. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { - "properties": {}, + "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", + "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + } + }, "type": "object" }, "name": "exposure_radar", + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "anyOf": [ { + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/get_cve +++ observed/get_cve { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "One CVE's record: description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cvss_v4_score and cvss_v4_severity, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and score_confidence, epss_score and epss_percentile, CISA-KEV status (kev_listed, kev_added_date, kev_due_date, kev_ransomware) and, if KEV-listed, CISA's own text relayed verbatim (kev_required_action, not EchelonGraph's advice; kev_short_description; kev_notes_urls), ghsa_id, references, cpe_match (one flat list) and cpe_configurations (NVD's configurations as NVD sent them, with each AND/OR operator; absent where none is stored, which is not a finding that no product is affected), remediation (a capped summary of its fix), published, modified and updated_at; each field only where the record has it. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds evidence of a fix for the CVE, and patch_evidence names its sources, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, each list in the record keeps its first entries, and the note names each list cut with its full length.", + "description": "One CVE's record: description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cvss_v4_score and cvss_v4_severity, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and score_confidence, epss_score and epss_percentile, CISA-KEV status (kev_listed, kev_added_date, kev_due_date, kev_ransomware) and, if KEV-listed, CISA's own text relayed verbatim (kev_required_action, not EchelonGraph's advice; kev_short_description; kev_notes_urls), ghsa_id, references, cpe_match (one flat list) and cpe_configurations (NVD's configurations as NVD sent them, with each AND/OR operator; absent where none is stored, which is not a finding that no product is affected), remediation (a capped summary of its fix), published, modified and updated_at; each field only where the record has it. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2023-44487. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds evidence of a fix for the CVE, and patch_evidence names its sources, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each list in the record keeps its first entries, and the note names each list cut with its full length.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + }, + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" } }, "required": [ + "cna": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "name": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "short_name": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The CNA that wrote the CVE record: short_name as the record gives it, and name, the CVE Program's name for that CNA (the short name where its list does not hold it). Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field." + }, + "cna_solution": { + "description": "The sentence of the CVE record's solutions, written by its CNA, that names a released fix, verbatim: what makes cna_solution patch evidence. It is the CNA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. Absent where the record's solutions name no fixed version, as well as where the field itself is: Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "cpe_configurations": { "anyOf": [ { + "date_public": { + "description": "When the vulnerability was made public, as the CVE record's CNA states it (the record's datePublic: \"if known, the date/time the vulnerability was disclosed publicly\"). It is the CNA's date, not the record's own publication date, which is published. Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "date_public_source": { + "description": "Whose date date_public is: cna, the CVE record's CNA. Absent whenever date_public is.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "description": { "type": [ "string", + "echelongraph_ssvc_decision": { + "description": "The SSVC decision (Act, Attend, Track* or Track) EchelonGraph computes with CISA's decision table at medium mission impact. CISA publishes the table and, for some CVEs, its inputs, not a decision for a CVE. score_factors.ssvc gives the decision at low, medium and high mission impact, with each input and its source.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "epss_percentile": { "type": [ "number", - "description": "CISA's requiredAction for the CVE, verbatim from its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: the action CISA requires of US federal civilian agencies under Binding Operational Directive 22-01, by kev_due_date. It is CISA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. Absent where the CVE is not CISA-KEV-listed, where CISA's entry has none, or where EchelonGraph has not stored it yet (an API older than the field serves none).", + "description": "CISA's requiredAction for the CVE, verbatim from its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: the action CISA requires of US federal civilian agencies under Binding Operational Directive 26-04 (which replaced BOD 22-01 on 10 June 2026), by kev_due_date. It is CISA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. Absent where the CVE is not CISA-KEV-listed, where CISA's entry has none, or where EchelonGraph has not stored it yet (an API older than the field serves none).", "type": [ "string", "null" + "vendor_advisory_fix", "nvd_patch_reference", - "cna_patch_reference" + "cna_patch_reference", + "cna_solution", + "description_fix" ], "type": "string" }, - "description": "The sources of the fix evidence EchelonGraph holds for the CVE, strongest first: vendor_patch (a vendor patch on record, from Ubuntu or Red Hat), fixed_version (a fixed version recorded for an affected package, or the fixed bound of an affected version range), release_reference (a reference that EchelonGraph confirmed through the GitHub API is a published release containing the fix, or a pull request or commit that a published release contains), nvd_patch_reference (an NVD reference tagged Patch) and cna_patch_reference (a reference the CVE's CNA tagged patch in its CVE record). Empty where none was found when EchelonGraph last computed it. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not name the evidence." + "description": "The sources of the fix evidence EchelonGraph holds for the CVE, strongest first: vendor_patch (a vendor patch on record, from Ubuntu or Red Hat), fixed_version (a fixed version recorded for an affected package, or the fixed bound of an affected version range), release_reference (a reference that EchelonGraph confirmed through the GitHub API is a published release containing the fix, or a pull request or commit that a published release contains), vendor_advisory_fix (a vendor advisory that lists a fix for the CVE under the vendor's own structured category: Red Hat's CSAF vendor_fix, Microsoft's Vendor Fix), nvd_patch_reference (an NVD reference tagged Patch), cna_patch_reference (a reference the CVE's CNA tagged patch in its CVE record), cna_solution (a sentence of the CVE record's solutions, written by its CNA, that names a fixed version; relayed as cna_solution) and description_fix (a sentence of the CVE description that names a fixed version). Empty where none was found when EchelonGraph last computed it. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not name the evidence." }, "published": { "type": [ - "properties": {}, + "properties": { + "fix_status": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "basis": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "described_by": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "listed_in_patch_table": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "solution_by": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "cna": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "statement": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "state": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "available", + "fix_referenced", + "fix_merged", + "none_confirmed", + "unknown" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "stated_in_record": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "unread_inputs": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read." + } + }, "type": "object" }, { - "description": "A capped summary (at most 1,500 characters of JSON) of how the CVE is fixed, as its sources state it: vendor_remediation_kinds (per kind, the vendor advisories listing one for this CVE, by the vendor's own category), vendor_advisories, vendors_not_parsed, kev_required_action (CISA's, verbatim), fixed_branches_count, fixed_versions (per package, fixed versions on record), fix_references (URLs tagged Patch or Mitigation), failed_sections, truncated, and see, the name of the tool that returns the whole, with each text. A kind missing from vendor_remediation_kinds is not a finding that no such remediation exists. Absent for a REJECTED CVE and from an API older than the field." + "description": "A capped summary (at most 1,500 characters of JSON) of how the CVE is fixed, as its sources state it: fix_status first (the API's fix-status rule: state, basis, described_by, solution_by, stated_in_record, listed_in_patch_table and unread_inputs), vendor_remediation_kinds (per kind, the vendor advisories listing one for this CVE, by the vendor's own category), vendor_advisories, vendors_not_parsed, kev_required_action (CISA's, verbatim), fixed_branches_count, fixed_versions (per package, fixed versions on record), fix_references (URLs tagged Patch or Mitigation by NVD, or patch or mitigation by the CNA), failed_sections, truncated, and see, the name of the tool that returns the whole, with each text. A kind missing from vendor_remediation_kinds is not a finding that no such remediation exists. Absent for a REJECTED CVE and from an API older than the field." }, "score_assessed": { "description": "Whether EchelonGraph has scored the CVE. true: echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are its score. false: the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0, and any of those three it carries is a placeholder, not a rating; the API may leave them out. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not say whether the CVE was scored.", + "score_factors": { + "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed." + }, "score_unassessed_reason": { "description": "Why score_assessed is false: no_signal, no source has yet published severity data EchelonGraph can score; or rejected, the record was withdrawn by its numbering authority and is never scored. Absent when the CVE is scored.", "type": [ + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/get_cwe +++ observed/get_cwe { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "One CWE (weakness class) and the CVEs classified under it. Returns cwe_id, name and description (from the MITRE CWE catalog EchelonGraph embeds, version catalog_version), total (the active CVEs in EchelonGraph's feed that an NVD, GitHub or CVE.org record classifies under it, rejected and reserved records left out), and cves, one page of 50: each with cve_id, severity, cvss_v3_score, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity, score_assessed, kev_listed, published and a shortened description. order says how the rows are sorted (CISA-KEV-listed first, then EchelonGraph score); an answer without order does not state its order, and the note says so. page is the page served, page_size its size and max_page the last page the API serves: a later page is answered as max_page, so past max_page pages total counts CVEs no page lists. echelongraph_score is EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true; the note labels each row that is NOT YET SCORED. A total of 0 says that no CVE in EchelonGraph's feed is classified under that CWE, not that none exists. Pass cwe_id like CWE-79 (or 79) and an optional page (1-200). Its structured result carries state (measured), measured_at (null), method, coverage (total, returned, page, page_requested, page_size, max_page), freshness (null) and notes, with data equal to the API's JSON; the result's last text block repeats it without data (the first text block) and without the note's sentences (the text block before it), with which notes ends. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", + "description": "One CWE (weakness class) and the CVEs classified under it. Returns cwe_id, name and description (from the MITRE CWE catalog EchelonGraph embeds, version catalog_version), total (the active CVEs in EchelonGraph's feed that an NVD, GitHub or CVE.org record classifies under it, rejected and reserved records left out), and cves, one page of 50: each with cve_id, severity, cvss_v3_score, echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity, score_assessed, kev_listed, published and a shortened description. order says how the rows are sorted (CISA-KEV-listed first, then EchelonGraph score); an answer without order does not state its order, and the note says so. page is the page served, page_size its size and max_page the last page the API serves: a later page is answered as max_page, so past max_page pages total counts CVEs no page lists. echelongraph_score is EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true; the note labels each row that is NOT YET SCORED. A total of 0 says that no CVE in EchelonGraph's feed is classified under that CWE, not that none exists. Pass cwe_id like CWE-79 (or 79) and an optional page (1-200). Its structured result carries state (measured), measured_at (null), method, coverage (total, returned, page, page_requested, page_size, max_page), freshness (null) and notes, with data equal to the API's JSON; the result's last text block repeats it without data (the first text block) and without the note's sentences (the text block before it), with which notes ends. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "page": { "description": "page of 50 CVEs (default 1, max 200)", "maximum": 200, + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/get_vendor_advisory +++ observed/get_vendor_advisory { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "One vendor advisory in full, by vendor and the vendor's advisory ID (the vendor and vendor_advisory_id of a vendor advisory row): title, description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cve_ids and known_cve_ids (those with a record in EchelonGraph's CVE feed), affected_products, remediation, references, vendor_modified_at, and withdrawn_at and withdrawn_reason when the vendor withdrew it. remediations lists each remediation the vendor lists, with kind (the vendor's own category, never read from the text: vendor_fix, workaround, mitigation, no_fix_planned, none_available or other), source_category, text, url and the cve_ids and product_ids it covers; each text is the vendor's, verbatim, untested by EchelonGraph. remediation_state is parsed, none_in_source, not_parsed or withdrawn: none_in_source and not_parsed are not a finding that no fix exists. Each advisory carries vendor_published_at (the vendor's date), our_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph first recorded it) and withdrawn (true: the vendor rescinded it). Each advisory also carries rejected_cve_ids: the CVE IDs it names whose CVE record was rejected (withdrawn) by its numbering authority, which are not active vulnerabilities. coverage.vendor_window is that vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories, earliest_vendor_published_at, latest_vendor_published_at, held_since (where that window begins) and history_backfill (in_progress or not_started: older advisories not all held yet); null when the windows could not be read or carry none for that vendor. measured_at is our_first_seen_at. Its freshness is null: the answer carries no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", + "description": "One vendor advisory in full, by vendor and the vendor's advisory ID (the vendor and vendor_advisory_id of a vendor advisory row): title, description, severity, cvss_v3_score, cve_ids and known_cve_ids (those with a record in EchelonGraph's CVE feed), affected_products, remediation, references, vendor_modified_at, and withdrawn_at and withdrawn_reason when the vendor withdrew it. remediations lists each remediation the vendor lists, with kind (the vendor's own category, never read from the text: vendor_fix, workaround, mitigation, no_fix_planned, none_available or other), source_category, text, url and the cve_ids and product_ids it covers; each text is the vendor's, verbatim, untested by EchelonGraph. remediation_state is parsed, none_in_source, not_parsed or withdrawn: none_in_source and not_parsed are not a finding that no fix exists. Each advisory carries vendor_published_at (the vendor's date), our_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph first recorded it) and withdrawn (true: the vendor rescinded it). Each advisory also carries rejected_cve_ids: the CVE IDs it names whose CVE record was rejected (withdrawn) by its numbering authority, which are not active vulnerabilities. coverage.vendor_window is that vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories, earliest_vendor_published_at, latest_vendor_published_at, held_since (where that window begins) and history_backfill (in_progress or not_started: older advisories not all held yet); null when the windows could not be read or carry none for that vendor. measured_at is our_first_seen_at. Its freshness is null: the answer carries no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "vendor": { "description": "the vendor slug, e.g. microsoft, redhat, github", "type": "string" + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/kev_recent +++ observed/kev_recent { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "The CVEs CISA has added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, newest first, from EchelonGraph's copy of that catalog, which polls CISA's feed every 5 minutes. Each kev row gives cve_id, kev_added_date (CISA's dateAdded), kev_due_date, kev_vendor, kev_product, kev_vuln_name and kev_ransomware (known ransomware-campaign use), EchelonGraph's severity, cvss_v3_score, epss_score, epss_percentile and eg_kev_tier for the CVE, and our_first_seen_kev, when EchelonGraph's poller first recorded the CVE entering the catalog (null where no such record exists). Filter by since and until (YYYY-MM-DD, inclusive, on kev_added_date), ransomware, and vendor (an exact, case-insensitive match on kev_vendor); page with limit (1 to 200, default 50) and cursor, passing back the previous page's next_cursor with the same filters. total counts the CVEs matching the filters; kev_listed_total counts every CVE EchelonGraph holds as KEV-listed, and catalog.catalog_count is CISA's own count in the catalog last fetched, so a gap between the two is entries not yet in EchelonGraph's CVE table, which no page returns. CISA's requiredAction, shortDescription and notes are not in these rows: each CVE's own record carries them, verbatim and labelled as CISA's. Its structured result's measured_at is our last successful fetch of CISA's feed (null when the API does not say), coverage counts the CISA KEV catalog (total, returned, kev_listed_total, catalog_count, limit, has_more) and freshness gives last_successful_fetch_at, catalog_version and date_released. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, each row keeps cve_id, kev_added_date, kev_vendor and kev_ransomware at least, or rows are left out, and next_cursor still continues after the page's last row, not the text's.", + "description": "The CVEs CISA has added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, newest first, from EchelonGraph's copy of that catalog, which polls CISA's feed every 5 minutes. Each kev row gives cve_id, kev_added_date (CISA's dateAdded), kev_due_date, kev_vendor, kev_product, kev_vuln_name and kev_ransomware (known ransomware-campaign use), EchelonGraph's severity, cvss_v3_score, epss_score, epss_percentile and eg_kev_tier for the CVE, and our_first_seen_kev, when EchelonGraph's poller first recorded the CVE entering the catalog (null where no such record exists). Filter by since and until (YYYY-MM-DD, inclusive, on kev_added_date), ransomware, and vendor (an exact, case-insensitive match on kev_vendor); page with limit (1 to 200, default 50) and cursor, passing back the previous page's next_cursor with the same filters. total counts the CVEs matching the filters; kev_listed_total counts every CVE EchelonGraph holds as KEV-listed, and catalog.catalog_count is CISA's own count in the catalog last fetched, so a gap between the two is entries not yet in EchelonGraph's CVE table, which no page returns. CISA's requiredAction, shortDescription and notes are not in these rows: each CVE's own record carries them, verbatim and labelled as CISA's. Its structured result's measured_at is our last successful fetch of CISA's feed (null when the API does not say), coverage counts the CISA KEV catalog (total, returned, kev_listed_total, catalog_count, limit, has_more) and freshness gives last_successful_fetch_at, catalog_version and date_released. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps cve_id, kev_added_date, kev_vendor and kev_ransomware at least, or rows are left out, and next_cursor still continues after the page's last row, not the text's.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "limit": { "description": "page size (default 50, max 200)", "maximum": 200, + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "anyOf": [ { + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/scan_manifest +++ observed/scan_manifest { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Check a project's lockfile or pinned manifest against EchelonGraph's advisory corpus, one verdict per dependency. Pass files: 1 to 20 of filename and content, up to 5,000,000 characters in all; the filename, or format, gives the format. Read: requirements.txt (== and === pins only), go.mod (require, after replace and exclude), package-lock.json and npm-shrinkwrap.json (v1 to v3), Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock, composer.lock, poetry.lock and gradle.lockfile. package.json, pyproject.toml, Pipfile, Gemfile, Cargo.toml, composer.json and build.gradle hold ranges and are refused, naming the lockfile to pass; go.sum is refused: it lists versions the build does not select. This server reads the files into purls and only the purls are sent to the API, in POST bodies of at most 200, never in a URL; filenames and file contents are not sent on. Run from npm, this server is on your machine; over the hosted endpoint (mcp.echelongraph.io) it is EchelonGraph's, and the files are the request body, accepted up to 6 MiB. data.results holds one row per distinct purl, with verdict (affected, not_affected, undetermined or not_assessed), not_assessed_reason, cve_ids and matched_via; each match carries kev_listed, epss_score and fixed_in or null with fixed_in_reason. not_affected is the only clean verdict. data.not_checked lists each entry not sent, with file, line and reason: version_unpinned (a range), version_unresolved, local_path, vcs_source or unsupported_line; not_checked entries are not clean. At most 2,000 distinct purls per call, within 50 seconds; data.not_sent_purls lists any not sent, unchecked and not clean. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, each row keeps index, purl, verdict, not_assessed_reason and cve_ids at least; not_checked keeps its first 20.", + "description": "Check a project's lockfile or pinned manifest against EchelonGraph's advisory corpus, one verdict per dependency. Pass files: 1 to 20 of filename and content, up to 5,000,000 characters in all; the filename, or format, gives the format. Read: requirements.txt (== and === pins only), go.mod (require, after replace and exclude), package-lock.json and npm-shrinkwrap.json (v1 to v3), Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock, composer.lock, poetry.lock and gradle.lockfile. package.json, pyproject.toml, Pipfile, Gemfile, Cargo.toml, composer.json and build.gradle hold ranges and are refused, naming the lockfile to pass; go.sum is refused: it lists versions the build does not select. This server reads the files into purls and only the purls are sent to the API, in POST bodies of at most 200, never in a URL; filenames and file contents are not sent on. Run from npm, this server is on your machine; over the hosted endpoint (mcp.echelongraph.io) it is EchelonGraph's, and the files are the request body, accepted up to 6 MiB. data.results holds one row per distinct purl, with verdict (affected, not_affected, undetermined or not_assessed), not_assessed_reason, cve_ids and matched_via; each match carries kev_listed, epss_score and fixed_in or null with fixed_in_reason. not_affected is the only clean verdict. data.not_checked lists each entry not sent, with file, line and reason: version_unpinned (a range), version_unresolved, local_path, vcs_source or unsupported_line; not_checked entries are not clean. At most 2,000 distinct purls per call, within 50 seconds; data.not_sent_purls lists any not sent, unchecked and not clean. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps index, purl, verdict, not_assessed_reason and cve_ids at least; not_checked keeps its first 20.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + }, + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" } }, "required": [ - "description": "The fixed bound of the advisory interval that holds this component's version, always above it. null when that interval records no fix (it ends at last_affected, or has no end) or no interval holds the version, with fixed_in_reason saying which.", + "description": "The lowest version above this component's that no affected interval of the CVE's record for the package holds, always above it: the fixed bound of the interval that holds the component's version, moved past any overlapping interval that still holds that bound (fixed_in_detail then names it). null when no such version is on record (an interval on the way records no fix: it ends at last_affected, or has no end) or no interval holds the version, with fixed_in_reason saying which.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "fixed_in_detail": { + "description": "Set when fixed_in is not the fixed bound of the interval that holds the component's version: the overlapping intervals of the same record it moved past, which still hold that bound.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "fixed_in_reason": { "description": "Why fixed_in is null; absent when fixed_in is a version.", "type": [ - "description": "Why the advisory applies, with the advisory interval the version falls inside: \"[A, B)\" names the fixed version B, \"[A, B]\" the last affected version B. On an upstream row it ends by naming the source package and the purl name.", + "description": "Why the advisory applies, with the advisory interval the version falls inside: \"[A, B)\" names that interval's fixed bound B (another interval of the advisory can still hold B; fixed_in is the version past them all), \"[A, B]\" the last affected version B. On an upstream row it ends by naming the source package and the purl name.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/search_cves +++ observed/search_cves { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Search/list CVEs from EchelonGraph's CVE feed (NVD + MITRE-CNA pre-NVD + CISA-KEV + EPSS + GitHub GHSA, each polled on a schedule). Filter by severity, minimum CVSS, free text, and sort; page with limit and offset. Returns cves, each with cve_id, severity, cvss_v3_score, echelongraph_score and score_assessed (whether EchelonGraph has scored it), epss_score and kev_listed where the record has them, and the list's total, total_counted (false: total is not a count), total_is_lower_bound (true: at least total), search_relaxed, limit and offset. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds evidence of a fix for the CVE, and patch_evidence names its sources, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, each row keeps at least the fields named above and the first 200 characters of its description (100 on a page too long for that), or rows are left out and the note gives the offset to call next.", + "description": "Search/list CVEs from EchelonGraph's CVE feed (NVD + MITRE-CNA pre-NVD + CISA-KEV + EPSS + GitHub GHSA, each polled on a schedule). Filter by severity, minimum CVSS, free text, and sort; page with limit and offset. Returns cves, each with cve_id, severity, cvss_v3_score, echelongraph_score and score_assessed (whether EchelonGraph has scored it), epss_score and kev_listed where the record has them, and the list's total, total_counted (false: total is not a count), total_is_lower_bound (true: at least total), search_relaxed, limit and offset. echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are EchelonGraph's score only when score_assessed is true. With score_assessed false the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0: any of those three it carries (0, NONE, 0) is a placeholder, not a rating, and does not mean the CVE is harmless; score_unassessed_reason says why, and the note labels each such CVE NOT YET SCORED. An answer with no score_assessed (an API older than that field) does not say whether the CVE was scored, the note says so, and a 0 there is not a rating either. patch_available is true when EchelonGraph holds evidence of a fix for the CVE, and patch_evidence names its sources, strongest first. patch_available false means no fix evidence is on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists. Its freshness is null: the feed serves no poll-completion time. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps at least the fields named above and the first 200 characters of its description (100 on a page too long for that), or rows are left out and the note gives the offset to call next.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "limit": { "description": "page size (default 20, max 50)", "maximum": 50, + "cna": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "name": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "short_name": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The CNA that wrote the CVE record: short_name as the record gives it, and name, the CVE Program's name for that CNA (the short name where its list does not hold it). Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field." + }, + "cna_solution": { + "description": "The sentence of the CVE record's solutions, written by its CNA, that names a released fix, verbatim: what makes cna_solution patch evidence. It is the CNA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. Absent where the record's solutions name no fixed version, as well as where the field itself is: Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "cpe_configurations": { "anyOf": [ { + "date_public": { + "description": "When the vulnerability was made public, as the CVE record's CNA states it (the record's datePublic: \"if known, the date/time the vulnerability was disclosed publicly\"). It is the CNA's date, not the record's own publication date, which is published. Absent where EchelonGraph has not read the CVE record's CNA container yet, where the record has none, for a REJECTED CVE, and from an API older than the field.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "date_public_source": { + "description": "Whose date date_public is: cna, the CVE record's CNA. Absent whenever date_public is.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "description": { "type": [ "string", + "echelongraph_ssvc_decision": { + "description": "The SSVC decision (Act, Attend, Track* or Track) EchelonGraph computes with CISA's decision table at medium mission impact. CISA publishes the table and, for some CVEs, its inputs, not a decision for a CVE. score_factors.ssvc gives the decision at low, medium and high mission impact, with each input and its source.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "epss_percentile": { "type": [ "number", - "description": "CISA's requiredAction for the CVE, verbatim from its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: the action CISA requires of US federal civilian agencies under Binding Operational Directive 22-01, by kev_due_date. It is CISA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. Absent where the CVE is not CISA-KEV-listed, where CISA's entry has none, or where EchelonGraph has not stored it yet (an API older than the field serves none).", + "description": "CISA's requiredAction for the CVE, verbatim from its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: the action CISA requires of US federal civilian agencies under Binding Operational Directive 26-04 (which replaced BOD 22-01 on 10 June 2026), by kev_due_date. It is CISA's text, not EchelonGraph's advice. Absent where the CVE is not CISA-KEV-listed, where CISA's entry has none, or where EchelonGraph has not stored it yet (an API older than the field serves none).", "type": [ "string", "null" + "vendor_advisory_fix", "nvd_patch_reference", - "cna_patch_reference" + "cna_patch_reference", + "cna_solution", + "description_fix" ], "type": "string" }, - "description": "The sources of the fix evidence EchelonGraph holds for the CVE, strongest first: vendor_patch (a vendor patch on record, from Ubuntu or Red Hat), fixed_version (a fixed version recorded for an affected package, or the fixed bound of an affected version range), release_reference (a reference that EchelonGraph confirmed through the GitHub API is a published release containing the fix, or a pull request or commit that a published release contains), nvd_patch_reference (an NVD reference tagged Patch) and cna_patch_reference (a reference the CVE's CNA tagged patch in its CVE record). Empty where none was found when EchelonGraph last computed it. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not name the evidence." + "description": "The sources of the fix evidence EchelonGraph holds for the CVE, strongest first: vendor_patch (a vendor patch on record, from Ubuntu or Red Hat), fixed_version (a fixed version recorded for an affected package, or the fixed bound of an affected version range), release_reference (a reference that EchelonGraph confirmed through the GitHub API is a published release containing the fix, or a pull request or commit that a published release contains), vendor_advisory_fix (a vendor advisory that lists a fix for the CVE under the vendor's own structured category: Red Hat's CSAF vendor_fix, Microsoft's Vendor Fix), nvd_patch_reference (an NVD reference tagged Patch), cna_patch_reference (a reference the CVE's CNA tagged patch in its CVE record), cna_solution (a sentence of the CVE record's solutions, written by its CNA, that names a fixed version; relayed as cna_solution) and description_fix (a sentence of the CVE description that names a fixed version). Empty where none was found when EchelonGraph last computed it. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not name the evidence." }, "published": { "type": [ - "properties": {}, + "properties": { + "fix_status": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "basis": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "described_by": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "listed_in_patch_table": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "solution_by": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": {}, + "properties": { + "cna": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "statement": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "state": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "anyOf": [ + { + "enum": [ + "available", + "fix_referenced", + "fix_merged", + "none_confirmed", + "unknown" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "string" + } + ] + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + }, + "stated_in_record": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] + }, + "unread_inputs": { + "anyOf": [ + { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "description": "The API's fix-status rule for the CVE, the one CVE Pulse pages show: state is available (a fix is on record), fix_referenced (a reference tagged Patch, often a source commit, and no release confirmed), fix_merged (an upstream fix merged, not yet in a tagged release), none_confirmed (no fix evidence on record, which is not a finding that no fix exists) or unknown (an input could not be read). basis is the step of the rule that decided it; described_by is the CVE description's sentence naming the fix, solution_by the CVE record's solution sentence naming it (statement) and the CNA that wrote it (cna), stated_in_record that patch_evidence counts a fix the CVE record states with no sentence to quote, listed_in_patch_table that a fixed version or patch row is on record; unread_inputs names any input the API could not read." + } + }, "type": "object" }, { - "description": "A capped summary (at most 1,500 characters of JSON) of how the CVE is fixed, as its sources state it: vendor_remediation_kinds (per kind, the vendor advisories listing one for this CVE, by the vendor's own category), vendor_advisories, vendors_not_parsed, kev_required_action (CISA's, verbatim), fixed_branches_count, fixed_versions (per package, fixed versions on record), fix_references (URLs tagged Patch or Mitigation), failed_sections, truncated, and see, the name of the tool that returns the whole, with each text. A kind missing from vendor_remediation_kinds is not a finding that no such remediation exists. Absent for a REJECTED CVE and from an API older than the field." + "description": "A capped summary (at most 1,500 characters of JSON) of how the CVE is fixed, as its sources state it: fix_status first (the API's fix-status rule: state, basis, described_by, solution_by, stated_in_record, listed_in_patch_table and unread_inputs), vendor_remediation_kinds (per kind, the vendor advisories listing one for this CVE, by the vendor's own category), vendor_advisories, vendors_not_parsed, kev_required_action (CISA's, verbatim), fixed_branches_count, fixed_versions (per package, fixed versions on record), fix_references (URLs tagged Patch or Mitigation by NVD, or patch or mitigation by the CNA), failed_sections, truncated, and see, the name of the tool that returns the whole, with each text. A kind missing from vendor_remediation_kinds is not a finding that no such remediation exists. Absent for a REJECTED CVE and from an API older than the field." }, "score_assessed": { "description": "Whether EchelonGraph has scored the CVE. true: echelongraph_score, echelongraph_severity and echelongraph_risk are its score. false: the CVE is NOT YET SCORED, not scored 0, and any of those three it carries is a placeholder, not a rating; the API may leave them out. Absent (an API older than the field): the answer does not say whether the CVE was scored.", + "score_factors": { + "description": "EchelonGraph's evidence for its score. ssvc: the SSVC decision at every mission impact level, each input with its source. bod_26_04 (scorer v3.4 and later): CISA BOD 26-04's remediation timeline, if_publicly_exposed and if_not_publicly_exposed, each a list of CERT/CC's keys (3DF, 3D, 14D, 60D, FSU) named in timelines, with kev, automatable and technical_impact, each with its source; source cisa_bod_26_04_default is CISA's own default for a CVE not in KEV that nobody has assessed." + }, "score_unassessed_reason": { "description": "Why score_assessed is false: no_signal, no source has yet published severity data EchelonGraph can score; or rejected, the record was withdrawn by its numbering authority and is never scored. Absent when the CVE is scored.", "type": [ + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/search_vendor_advisories +++ observed/search_vendor_advisories { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Search or list vendor-published advisories, newest first. A query of 3 or more characters is matched case-insensitively as a substring of each advisory's title, description, vendor name, IDs and affected_products (search_match substring). A query of 1 or 2 characters matches whole words only (search_match word). Filter by vendor (slug), severity band and whether the advisory names any CVE ID. Advisories their vendor withdrew are left out. Returns advisories, each with vendor, vendor_advisory_id, title, severity, cvss_v3_score, cve_ids, summary and affected_products where present, and total, total_capped, limit, offset, search_applied and search_match. A search counts at most 1,000 matches: past that, total is 1000 and total_capped is true, which means 1,000 or more (the note writes 1,000+), never exactly 1,000. Each advisory also carries rejected_cve_ids: the CVE IDs it names whose CVE record was rejected (withdrawn) by its numbering authority, which are not active vulnerabilities. The query is sent in a request header, never in the URL. coverage repeats those beside returned, and gives vendor_windows, each vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories, earliest_vendor_published_at, latest_vendor_published_at, held_since (where that window begins) and history_backfill (in_progress or not_started: older advisories not all held yet). An advisory published before its vendor's held_since may not be held, so no advisory from a vendor is not a finding that it published none. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, each row keeps vendor, vendor_advisory_id, title, severity and cve_ids at least, its strings and lists shortened, or rows are left out and the note gives the offset to call next.", + "description": "Search or list vendor-published advisories, newest first. A query of 3 or more characters is matched case-insensitively as a substring of each advisory's title, description, vendor name, IDs and affected_products (search_match substring). A query of 1 or 2 characters matches whole words only (search_match word). Filter by vendor (slug), severity band and whether the advisory names any CVE ID. Advisories their vendor withdrew are left out. Returns advisories, each with vendor, vendor_advisory_id, title, severity, cvss_v3_score, cve_ids, summary and affected_products where present, and total, total_capped, limit, offset, search_applied and search_match. A search counts at most 1,000 matches: past that, total is 1000 and total_capped is true, which means 1,000 or more (the note writes 1,000+), never exactly 1,000. Each advisory also carries rejected_cve_ids: the CVE IDs it names whose CVE record was rejected (withdrawn) by its numbering authority, which are not active vulnerabilities. The query is sent in a request header, never in the URL. coverage repeats those beside returned, and gives vendor_windows, each vendor's window in what EchelonGraph holds: vendor, advisories, earliest_vendor_published_at, latest_vendor_published_at, held_since (where that window begins) and history_backfill (in_progress or not_started: older advisories not all held yet). An advisory published before its vendor's held_since may not be held, so no advisory from a vendor is not a finding that it published none. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps vendor, vendor_advisory_id, title, severity and cve_ids at least, its strings and lists shortened, or rows are left out and the note gives the offset to call next.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "has_cve": { "description": "true: only advisories naming a CVE; false: only those naming none", "type": "boolean" + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
--- pinned/vendor_advisories_for_cve +++ observed/vendor_advisories_for_cve { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "The vendor-published advisories that name one CVE, newest first, at most 20: for each, vendor, vendor_display_name, vendor_advisory_id, title, severity and cvss_v3_score where the vendor gives them. Covers the vendor feeds EchelonGraph polls, for example Microsoft MSRC, Red Hat, Cisco, Palo Alto Networks and GitHub GHSA; an empty answer means none of the advisories EchelonGraph holds names the CVE, not that no vendor published one. Each advisory carries vendor_published_at (the vendor's date), our_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph first recorded it) and withdrawn (true: the vendor rescinded it). Each advisory also carries rejected_cve_ids: the CVE IDs it names whose CVE record was rejected (withdrawn) by its numbering authority, which are not active vulnerabilities. The answer's cve_rejected is true when the CVE record of the CVE asked for was rejected. Each row has remediation_kinds and remediation_state (not_parsed is not none). coverage gives returned, cap, at_cap (true: there may be more) and cve_year; vendor_windows, each vendor's held window: vendor, advisories, earliest_vendor_published_at, latest_vendor_published_at, held_since (where that window begins) and history_backfill (in_progress or not_started: older advisories not all held yet); and vendors_not_fully_held, the vendors absent from the answer of which EchelonGraph holds none, whose held_since is after 1 January of cve_year or not known, or whose history is still being read, which the note names. An advisory published before its vendor's held_since may not be held, so no advisory from a vendor is not a finding that it published none. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole. Cut, each row keeps vendor, vendor_advisory_id, title, severity and cve_ids at least, its strings and lists shortened.", + "description": "The vendor-published advisories that name one CVE, newest first, at most 20: for each, vendor, vendor_display_name, vendor_advisory_id, title, severity and cvss_v3_score where the vendor gives them. Covers the vendor feeds EchelonGraph polls, for example Microsoft MSRC, Red Hat, Cisco, Palo Alto Networks and GitHub GHSA; an empty answer means none of the advisories EchelonGraph holds names the CVE, not that no vendor published one. Each advisory carries vendor_published_at (the vendor's date), our_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph first recorded it) and withdrawn (true: the vendor rescinded it). Each advisory also carries rejected_cve_ids: the CVE IDs it names whose CVE record was rejected (withdrawn) by its numbering authority, which are not active vulnerabilities. The answer's cve_rejected is true when the CVE record of the CVE asked for was rejected. Each row has remediation_kinds and remediation_state (not_parsed is not none). coverage gives returned, cap, at_cap (true: there may be more) and cve_year; vendor_windows, each vendor's held window: vendor, advisories, earliest_vendor_published_at, latest_vendor_published_at, held_since (where that window begins) and history_backfill (in_progress or not_started: older advisories not all held yet); and vendors_not_fully_held, the vendors absent from the answer of which EchelonGraph holds none, whose held_since is after 1 January of cve_year or not known, or whose history is still being read, which the note names. An advisory published before its vendor's held_since may not be held, so no advisory from a vendor is not a finding that it published none. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); so is structured data (DATA CUT), unless full: true. Cut, each row keeps vendor, vendor_advisory_id, title, severity and cve_ids at least, its strings and lists shortened.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + }, + "full": { + "description": "true: data in the structured result is the answer whole, however long. Without it, a structured result past 30,000 characters of JSON has its data cut (DATA CUT): in an order the note states, the entries of its longest lists keep only some of their fields, and then the lists only some of their entries; data_truncated is true, and truncated gives each list cut with its total, the number returned and whether its entries are thinned. Whole data is for a program; a client that sizes structured results, as Claude Code does against MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, can refuse an answer past its cap.", + "type": "boolean" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated": { + "description": "false: data is the answer whole. true: the structured result would pass 30,000 characters of JSON with data whole, so data is cut (DATA CUT): the entries of some of its lists keep only some of their fields, or the lists only some of their entries, truncated gives each, and no string is shortened. The same call with full: true returns data whole.", + "type": "boolean" + }, "freshness": { "description": "The producing radar's last completed check (last_run_at), where the API serves one.", "type": "null" + }, + "truncated": { + "additionalProperties": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "returned": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "thinned": { + "const": true, + "type": "boolean" + }, + "total": { + "maximum": 9007199254740991, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + } + }, + "required": [ + "total", + "returned" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "description": "Present when data_truncated is true: each list of data that was cut, by its path in data (a dot between the names of an object and a list inside it), with total, its entries in the answer, returned, the entries data holds, and thinned, true when each of them keeps only some of its fields.", + "propertyNames": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "object" } }, "required": [ + "data_truncated", "data" ], "type": "object"
Changed 2026-10-11 12:42 UTC
1 description rewritten.
--- pinned/cve_intel +++ observed/cve_intel { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Weakness, public exploit code, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, first_seen_at and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total, exploits_capped, exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version, fixed_branches), fixed_versions (one row per fixed version, with the vulnerable_range it fixes) and timeline (the newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). fixed_branches lists each affected range of the package on record (introduced, and fixed or last_affected, with advisory_id (the OSV record that published the range) and source); in the ecosystem's version order, a version is in a range when it is at or above introduced (\"0\" is the first version) and below fixed, or at or below last_affected; that range's fixed is the fix for it. fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility, not the fix for every affected range. fixed_branches [] is not a finding that no fix exists. verified_status is a label from the source, not a guarantee the exploit works on a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which of them are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Pass a CVE ID like CVE-2021-44228. Its structured result carries notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; its coverage names the sections relayed, failed and left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", + "description": "Weakness, public exploit code, affected packages and fixed versions for one CVE, from EchelonGraph's per-CVE enrichment. Returns cwes (each cwe_id with name and source), exploits (each with kind, source_name, source_url, source_published_at (the source's date, null if none), eg_first_seen_at (when EchelonGraph recorded it) and verified_status; at most 10, verified first) with exploits_total, exploits_capped, exploits_by_kind and exploits_by_status, affected_packages (ecosystem, package_name, version_range, fixed_version, fixed_branches), fixed_versions (each fixed version with the vulnerable_range it fixes) and timeline (the newest enrichment-history rows, with timeline_total). fixed_branches lists each affected range on record (introduced, and fixed or last_affected, with advisory_id (its OSV record) and source); in the ecosystem's version order, a version is in a range when it is at or above introduced (\"0\" is the first version) and below fixed, or at or below last_affected; that range's fixed is the fix for it. fixed_version is one range's fix, kept for compatibility, not the fix for every affected range. fixed_branches [] is not a finding that no fix exists. verified_status is the source's label, not a guarantee the exploit works on a given system. An empty exploits list is not evidence that no public exploit exists: it covers only the sources EchelonGraph ingests, and which are polled depends on the deployment. A section the API could not read is named in coverage.sections_failed and left out of data, never relayed as an empty list. Its structured result carries notes, with data, which the first text block holds whole up to 30,000 characters; its coverage names the sections relayed, failed and left out. Past 30,000 characters of JSON, the first text block holds data cut to fit, and the note says what the cut leaves out and where to read it (TEXT CUT); data in the structured result always holds it whole.", "inputSchema": { "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "properties": { + "eg_first_seen_at": { + "description": "When EchelonGraph first recorded the reference, as a UTC timestamp: a date of EchelonGraph's, not the source's.", + "type": "string" + }, "first_seen_at": { + "description": "Deprecated: the same value as source_published_at, null when that is.", "type": [ "string", "null" + "source_published_at": { + "description": "The source's own date for the reference (Exploit-DB's date_published, a GitHub proof-of-concept repository's created_at, or the first commit of a nuclei template or Metasploit module where EchelonGraph derived it from the source's git history); null where the source gives none, and EchelonGraph supplies no stand-in date.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, "source_url": { "type": [ "string",
Current tools
Show all 16 tool fingerprints
check_affected
check_sbom
cve_exposure
cve_intel
cve_remediation
cve_summary
epss_history
exposure_radar
get_cve
get_cwe
get_vendor_advisory
kev_recent
scan_manifest
search_cves
search_vendor_advisories
vendor_advisories_for_cve
Watch this server yourself
If you run this server, put the proxy in front of it. It pins these exact fingerprints on first connect and stops the session if they move.
npx -y mcp-pin@0.2.3 -- <your echelongraph-mcp command>
Or subscribe to this page's RSS feed to be told when it changes.
Badge
The badge states one fact about time and nothing else. It never claims a server is safe.
[](https://mcp-pin.gautamkhosla.com/servers/4df29f56c9e4b2f6.html)